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ABSTRACT 
This thesis combines transitology and structural analyses to examine the obstacles 
to democracy in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.  The transitology approach analyzes the 
impact of domestic political factors (clan politics, corruption, and political Islam) and 
external influences on each country’s transition to post-communist rule.  The structural 
analysis focuses on those economic and societal factors that impact the country’s ability 
to foster and sustain democratic reforms.  For both countries, the complex interplay of 
clan politics and rampant corruption is the dominant factor in stifling democratic reforms.  
External influences were important in the case of Kyrgyzstan, though not determining, 
but were basically inconsequential in Uzbekistan.  In terms of structural factors, 
economic underdevelopment in each country has stifled the emergence of a large middle 
class and served as a catalyst for societal dissatisfaction.  In Uzbekistan, this 
dissatisfaction is being channeled into clan politics and political Islam because of 
President Karimov’s repression of political opposition and dissent.  In Kyrgyzstan, 
advanced progress on economic reform and an emergent civil society allow for more 
outlets for dissent, political dialog and meaningful democratic reforms.  The United 
States must continue to assist Kyrgyzstan in completing its economic reform agenda and 
possibly play a greater role in helping guide amendments to the constitution.  In 
Uzbekistan, the United States must rely on economic reform incentives tied to concrete 
milestones and look to engage the next generation of leaders with targeted assistance to 
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 The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 fundamentally changed how the United 
States approached national security and how it viewed Central Asia.  The stationing of 
U.S. troops in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, along with massive amounts of U.S. aid 
flowing into the region, were clear indicators that these countries were pivotal to the fight 
against international terrorism.  This new geopolitical reality also produced expectations 
that U.S. influence in the region would be a catalyst for political and economic reform in 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.  Indeed, the National Security Strategy issued by the Bush 
administration in 2002 underscored the world view that long-term stability and security 
can only be achieved by spreading democracy and expanding the concept of the market 
economy:  
 the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the 
benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the 
hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every 
corner of the world….poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make 
weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their 
borders.1   
Fifteen years after gaining independence, and over five years since the September 11 
attacks, all five Central Asian republics remain mired in authoritarianism.  Uzbekistan 
and even Kyrgyzstan, which offered some semblance of hope for reform, continue to be 
ruled by autocrats.  Why has democracy failed to take root in Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan?  Were these states simply ill-suited for democracy in terms of societal 
structure or did domestic and/or external political dynamics determine the fate of 
democratic reforms in these countries?  These are the fundamental questions addressed 
by this thesis.     
 The newly independent republics of Central Asia are vital to the battle against 
Islamic fundamentalism and are in desperate need of economic and political reform.  In 
                                                 
1 White House Press Office, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Sep 17, 2002), 
p. ii.    http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf#search=%22nss%202002%22  
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retrospect, they should have been the front line in the Bush doctrine of spreading 
democracy.  The overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the subsequent 
U.S.-led effort to install a democratic regime opened a window of opportunity for lasting 
political change in the region.  Furthermore,  
 
Figure 1.  Central Asia Map.2 
it held the promise of reversing the rise of militant Islam in Central Asia, which goes 
against the general nature Islam practiced in the region.  The problem is that the 
administration’s policy with respect to the Central Asian republics was forced to strike a 
balance between promoting democratic and economic reforms and engaging the ruling 
regimes as cooperative partners in the Global War on Terror.  So far the results are less 
than encouraging.  U.S. criticism of the Uzbekistan government in the wake of the 
Andijon massacre in May 2005 and the subsequent expulsion of U.S. troops from the 
                                                 
2 Map downloaded from Indiana University:  
http://www.indiana.edu/~afghan/maps/central_asia_map.jpg  
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country is one example.  The continued suppression of opposition political parties across 
the region, in spite of the hope promised by the 2005 Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan, is 
symptomatic of the struggle to achieve meaningful reforms.   
 Furthermore, any emphasis on democratic reforms clashed with Russian security 
strategies in Central Asia.  After September 11, Russia and the United States faced a 
common enemy (Islamic fundamentalism combined with terrorism) for the first time 
since the Second World War.  Russian and American security strategies with respect to 
Central Asia merged on the need to maintain regional stability in Central Asia and 
eliminate radical Islamic threats.  Russia, however, links stability in the region to the 
status-quo regimes.  As Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov put it, “By uncertainty we mean 
a political or military-political conflict or process that has a potential to pose a direct 
threat to Russia's security, or to change the geopolitical reality in a region of Russia's 
strategic interest. Our top concern is the internal situation in some members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], the club of former Soviet republics, and the 
regions around them.”3  By promoting freedom and democracy in Central Asia, the 
United States is attempting to introduce the very uncertainty that Moscow fears in its near 
abroad.  It is against this backdrop that one must consider the impact of external 
influences on the promotion of democratic reform.   
B.   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH 
 How realistic are U.S. expectations that democratic reforms can and will take hold 
in the Central Asian republics?  The goal of this thesis is to isolate the fundamental 
obstacles to democracy in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and point to policy options that the 
United States can utilize to overcome these obstacles.  With independence thrust upon 
them by the break-up of the Soviet Union, the eventual emergence of democracy seemed 
a reasonable expectation as other former Soviet republics were moving toward 
democratic governance.  However, only the Baltic Republics (Estonia, Lithuania and 
Latvia) have managed to achieve fully democratic regimes.  Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, 
Georgia and Russia continue to struggle with democratic reforms.  Belarus, Azerbaijan 
                                                 
3 Federico Bordonaro, “Why Russia Must Be Strong”, Asia Times On-Line (24 Feb 2006):  
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/HB24Ag02.html  (28 May 2006). 
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and the five Central Asian republics (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan 
and Tajikistan) remain mired in authoritarianism.   
 Though democracy has faltered in the entire region of Central Asia, this thesis 
focuses on Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan because, in many ways, the expectations for 
democracy were greater in these two countries than in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan or 
Tajikistan.  Civil war plagued Tajikistan from 1992 to 1997.  Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan are petroleum exporting states and considerable evidence points to the 
negative impact of petroleum wealth on democracy.4  Comparative analysis between 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan will help isolate the effect of economic development and 
other structural factors on the emergence of democracy.  This case study approach will 
enable a clear focus on the politics of the transition process and its effect on the resulting 
power structure.  Specifically, the thesis will examine the impact of structural factors and 
the domestic and external facets of transition politics in terms of their effect on 
democracy. Armed with a clearer understanding of why democracy has failed to take 
root, the United States can craft a better long-term strategy for promoting democratic 
ideals.   
C.   THESIS ORGANIZATION 
 The chapters in the thesis are organized to incrementally approach the major 
research question by using a case study approach.  Chapter II provides a comprehensive 
literature review that highlights the critical research on the emergence of democracy in 
general and with respect to Central Asia.  Chapters III and IV are the main chapters of 
this thesis and cover the plight of democracy in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, respectively.  
Each chapter focuses on the structural foundations (economic development, class 
structure, and civil society) for democracy as well as the political dynamics of regime 
transition.  The goal is to ascertain the impact of these different factors on the 
development of democracy in each country.  Finally, Chapter V will summarize the 
major findings of the research with respect to these two core trajectories – structural 
foundations and political dynamics.  It will also address the policy implications for the 
                                                 
4 Michael Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”, World Politics, 53, no. 3 (2001): 325-61. 
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United States in terms of achieving meaningful democratic reforms in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan.     
 Data will consist largely of primary and secondary sources.  Analysis of structural 
factors will rely heavily on economic development data from the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund.  Secondary sources will provide data on civil society in the 
region as well as the role of Islam.  Analysis of transition politics will rely primarily on 
secondary sources (journal articles), although some primary sources will include public 
opinion surveys, societal attitude studies and data from U.S. governmental agencies.  
Finally, measurement of democracy will rely on Freedom House rankings, Polity IV data 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A. DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY 
 The first step in this analysis is tackling the definition of democracy.  Defining 
democracy is especially critical in characterizing forms of government that lie 
somewhere between electoral democracy and authoritarianism.  According to Freedom 
House, electoral democracies are characterized by a competitive multi-party political 
system, universal adult suffrage for all citizens, regularly contested elections with ballot 
secrecy and the absence of massive voter fraud, and significant public access of major 
political parties to the electorate.5   Levitsky and Way, in analyzing the distinction 
between modern democracies and semi-democratic regimes utilize a similar definition of 
democracy, pointing to four minimum requirements: 1) Executives and legislatures are 
chosen through open, free and fair elections, 2) virtually universal adult suffrage, 3) 
political rights and civil liberties (including freedom of the press, freedom to associate 
and the freedom to criticize the government), and 4) elected authorities possess real 
authority to govern.6  They classify semi-democratic states as “competitive authoritarian” 
regimes, where violation of one or more of these four requirements is frequent and 
serious enough to give an advantage to the government in competing with the opposition.  
This study will use three main democracy indicators:  Freedom House ratings, Polity IV 
metrics and Bertelsmann Transformation Index ratings.    
B.   THEORIES ON THE EMERGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 
 Well before the Bush administration hailed democracy as a tool for changing the 
world order, social scientists have been studying the factors that influence democracy’s 
successful emergence.  The arguments fall into one of two categories.  Some argue that 
certain societal conditions dictate whether democracy will emerge and, if so, whether it 
will endure.  Others insist that structural variables insufficiently describe the complex 
                                                 
5 Freedom House, “Methodology”, Freedom House,  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2006 (Jan 2006). 
6 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism” Journal of 
Democracy, 13, no. 2 (2002): 53. 
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process that determines the nature of a governmental regime in transition.  Instead, they 
point to the more pivotal role of political actors and the dynamics of the decision-making 
during the regime transition.  The distinction between these two schools is critical.  If 
structural variables are the only causal factors, then external pressure for political reforms 
is doomed to fail; and the only viable mechanism for effecting democratic reforms is to 
build-up key structural elements in each state.     
C. STRUCTURAL PRECONDITIONS FOR DEMOCRACY APPROACH 
 The causal factor approach to analyzing democracy’s emergence and 
sustainability can be broken down into procedural and structural camps.  Schmitter and 
Karl, for instance, point to certain procedural requisites that are essential for democracy 
to succeed and remain stable.7  These include inherent and protected guarantees of 
political rights, civil rights and the rule of law.  Structural arguments stipulate that 
democracy’s emergence and success hinge on economic and societal institutions as well 
as the democratic beliefs and attitudes of its citizens.  Lipset championed the argument 
that certain societal characteristics are paramount.  He highlighted economic 
development, urbanization and education as foundations for democracy, though not 
necessarily as guarantors of its stability.8  The link between economic development 
(though not necessarily market liberalization) and democracy has gained considerable 
support.  Burkhart and Lewis-Beck used empirical data to effectively outline the positive 
relationship between democracy and economic development.9  Furthermore, economic 
stability, or at least the absence of serious economic crisis, is viewed as critical for 
stability and success in emerging democracies.10  Przeworski and Limongi reinforced this 
                                                 
7 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is….and Is Not”, in Essential 
Readings in Comparative Politics, ed. Patrick O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York:  W.W. Norton and 
Co., 2004), 224-5.  
8 Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites for Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy”, The American Political Science Review, 53, no. 1 (1959): 69-105. 
9 Ross E. Burkhart and Michael E. Lewis-Beck, “Comparative Democracy: the Economic 
Development Thesis”, American Political Science Review, 88, no. 4 (1994): 903-10. 
10 Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, “Economic Adjustment and Prospects for Democracy”, in 
The Politics of Economic Adjustment, ed. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), 321. 
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view, postulating that, once established, the survival of democracy was intimately linked 
to the state’s level of economic development.11   
D. TRANSITOLOGY APPROACH TO DEMOCRACY  
 The alternative view holds that structural pre-conditions for democracy are 
insufficient in explaining its emergence or survivability.   One argument in this vein 
focuses on the nature of transition itself, or transitology.  Rustow argues this approach in 
advocating that the nature of the process of regime change holds the key to democracy’s 
chances for emergence. He puts forth a dynamic model of regime transition, noting that 
“not all causal links run from social and economic to political factors.”12  The only 
requisite condition in his model is a sense of national identity.  The transition from 
oligarchy to democracy in this dynamic model proceeds through three distinct stages.  
The first stage is preparatory and involves a prolonged political struggle over one or more 
profound issues, often involving the emergence of a new elite class in society.  The 
second stage is characterized by a deliberate decision on the part of political leaders to 
accept the diversity of the national unity and institute crucial aspects of democratic 
procedure.  The final stage is habituation, whereby democratic institutions become 
entrenched as politicians and citizens learn to place their faith in the rules of the 
democratic system.13  Geddes similarly argues against causal pre-conditions, albeit 
acknowledging a strong link between economic development and democracy.  She 
advocates a model based on the characteristics of the authoritarian regime undergoing 
transition.  Of the three main types of authoritarian governments in her study, military 
regimes are the most likely to produce democracies due to the military’s general 
indifference to long-term governance.  Furthermore, the single-party regime (which 
represents post-communist states), is the most resilient (although transition to democracy 
is possible), but it is also the least understood.14  Finally, Fish highlights the inherent 
                                                 
11 Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts”, World Politcs, 49, 
no. 2 (1997): 155-83. 
12 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model”, Comparative 
Politics, 2, no. 3 (Apr 1970): 337 
13 Ibid., pp. 352-61. 
14 Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years”, Annual Review 
of Political Science, 99, no. 2 (1999): 115-44. 
 10
problems with procedural and structural theories, particularly as they relate to the post-
Communist experience, though he grudgingly notes the fact that economic development 
is “weakly” tied to democratization.  He postulates that variations in democracies across 
post-Communist states are best described by a “political constructivist” approach, which 
focuses on the outcomes of political struggles and choices that took place during regime 
change.   He emphasizes the importance of autonomous political actors and the strength 
and differentiation of political parties.  The core explanatory variables that determine the 
nature of the regime transition are the strength and development of autonomous societal 
organizations (civil society and political parties), the choice of constitutional form 
(specifically the extent to which power is dispersed), and the extent of economic reform.  
In examining these causal mechanisms, he views the process of regime transition as 
purely political and not societal.15        
E. DEMOCRACY THEORY AND CENTRAL ASIA 
 The debate over democracy’s failure in Central Asia draws on the two main 
approaches cited above, centering on either structural factors or the politics of the 
transition process.  McFaul, for instance, places political power and ideas at the center of 
his analysis of causal paths from communism to either democracy or dictatorship.16    He 
argues that that ideologies and the balance of power between the ancien régime and 
democratic challengers in the initial phase of the transition period are the key causal 
variables in determining the end result of the post-communist transition.  Others, 
however, focus on structural variables.  Matveeva argues that post-Soviet transitions in 
Central Asia cannot be attributed solely to political manipulations, but are the product of 
fundamental structural elements (societal structure, civil society, education and class 
structure).17   Anderson cites an insufficient civil society as the key to Kyrgyzstan’s 
struggles with democratic reforms.18  Furthermore, Green echoes this view, arguing that 
                                                 
15 M. Steven Fish, “Postcommunist Subversion: Social Science and Democratization in East Europe 
and Eurasia, Slavic Review, 58, no. 4: Special Issue: Ten Years After 1989: What Have We Learned? 
(1999): 794-823. 
16 Michael McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship, Noncooperative Transitions in 
the Postcommunist World”, World Politics, 54, (2002): 212-44. 
17 Anna Matveeva, “Democratization, Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia”, International 
Affairs (Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1944-), 75, no. 1(1999): 23-44. 
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the lack of civil society is directly related to democracy’s slow progress in the entire 
region.19       
 Islam is also an important factor when examining democracy in Central Asia.  
There are generally two schools of thought with respect Islam’s impact on the emergence 
of democracy.  One approach argues that Islam fosters a political culture that is 
incompatible with democracy.  Bernard Lewis, for example, points to the non-democratic 
nature of Islam, arguing that Islam, itself, promotes political acquiescence and thus is the 
source of Muslim society’s lack of democratic values.20  Tessler and Gao identified four 
general explanations to explain the lack of democracy in Muslim states: the resource 
curse, which is not directly related to Islam (wealthy Muslim states providing extensive 
services with no taxes have little pressure to democratize), lack of class conflict, the 
inability of opposition groups to join forces, and the political tradition of Islam (in which 
democracy, pluralism and popular sovereignty are profoundly alien).21   Zartman, 
however, adroitly notes that Islam is generally supportive of democratic governance, but 
the dialectical relationship between Islam and democracy breeds conflict when the 
particular form of political Islam precludes the range of options embodied in procedural 
democracy.  The incompatibility arises, he argues, when political Islam limits candidates 
for power to those who subscribe to the true path of the Muslim faith.22   
 Another school of thought challenges these findings by pointing to Muslim 
success stories, questioning the appropriateness of defining democracy in Western terms, 
which may not apply rigidly in Muslim societies, or by focusing solely on the structural 
factors that limit democracy in Muslim states.  Hoffman examined the compatibility of 
Islam and democracy at the individual level in comparison with Christian societies in 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 John Anderson, “Creating a Framework for Civil Society in Kyrgyzstan”, Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 
no. 1(2000): 77-93. 
19 Andrew Green, “Comparative Development of Post-Communist Civil Societies”, Europe-Asia 
Studies, 54, no. 3 (2002): 455-71. 
20 Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), 48. 
21 Mark Tessler and Eleanor Gao, “Gauging Arab Support for Democracy”, Journal of Democracy, 16, 
no. 3 (2005): 83- 97. 
22 William Zartman, “Democracy and Islam:  The Cultural Dialectic”, Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 524, Political Islam (1992): 189. 
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emerging democratic states in Eurasia. 23   He concluded that Muslims are actually more 
compatible with democracy than Christians.  Similar results were reported by Rose in his 
study of Muslim attitudes about democracy in Central Asia.24  Nasr focused attention on 
structural preconditions, identifying the interplay of three key structural and procedural 
factors that impact the rise of democracy in Muslim societies: withdrawal of the military 
from the politics, rise of an important private sector and increased competition for votes. 
25  Finally, Walker identified three crucial factors from the structural and procedural 
factors camp: the role of key state institutions (free speech and media, rule of law, 
elections), the strength of civil society (civic associations) and income distribution.26 
 In general, there is a great deal of scholarship on the nature of democracy’s 
emergence and survivability, but there is no overall consensus on what factors dominate 
the process.  The next two chapters will examine the plight of democracy in Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan and will draw on both of these approaches (transitology and structural 
factors) in an attempt to isolate the main obstacles to democracy in each state.  Each 
chapter focuses first on the political factors that influenced the nature of the post-
communist regime and then the structural conditions and their impact on the state’s 




                                                 
23 Steven Ryan Hofmann, “Islam and democracy: Micro-level indications of compatibility”, 
Comparative Political Studies 37, no.6 (2004): 652-76. 
24 Richard Rose, “How Muslims View Democracy: Evidence from Central Asia”, Journal of 
Democracy, 13, no. 4 (2002): 102-11. 
25 Vali Nasr, “The Rise of Muslim Democracy”, Journal of Democracy, 16, no. 2 (2005): 13-27. 
26 Martin Walker, “The Democratic Mosaic”, The Wilson Quarterly, 28, no. 2 (2004): 28-36. 
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III. KYRGYZSTAN CASE STUDY 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 For many reasons, Kyrgyzstan represented the greatest hope for democratic and 
economic reforms in Central Asia in the post September 11 world.  Throughout the mid-
1990s the country’s development of a democratic society was in-line with that of many 
states in East and Central Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Indeed, 
when Askar Akayev was elected president following independence, Kyrgyzstan became 
the only Central Asian republic that elected as its leader someone other than the leading 
Communist Party member.  Though Akayev was indeed a former member of the party, he 
was not the incumbent leader of the Republic, and that appeared to be a significant 
change.  However, these hopes proved short-lived as Akayev’s initial economic and 
political reforms failed to take hold and he subsequently lost enthusiasm for further 
movement toward democracy.  Also, despite the perceived success of the Tulip 
Revolution, which resulted in Akayev’s ouster in 2005, the country’s new leadership 
offered much of the same in terms of authoritarian rule.  The November 2006 protests 
over the battle for constitutional reform reflect growing frustration with the country’s 
authoritarian government and slow progress toward democratic reform.   
 This chapter aims to examine why democracy failed to take root in Kyrgyzstan 
and why the initial hopes went unfulfilled.  It will do so by focusing on the structural 
foundations (economic development, class structure, and civil society) for democracy as 
well as the internal and external factors that impacted the political dynamics of regime 
transition.  Economic development and class structure indicators will be derived 
primarily from World Bank and International Monetary Fund sources.  Assessments of 
civil society in Kyrgyzstan, as well as analysis of the political dynamics, will rely 
predominantly on academic analysis.       
B. STATE OF DEMOCRACY 
 The state of democracy is assessed by examining Freedom House, Polity IV, and 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index metrics.  Together, these systems provide a 
comprehensive evaluation of the country’s democratic institutions, the degree to which 
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power is shared within the government, and the extent of political representation by the 
people.  As Kyrgyzstan’s ratings below illustrate, the country’s formally democratic 
institutions are largely subject to the interests of the political leadership, and paternalistic 
networks now dominate the state bureaucracy.    
 1. Freedom House Ratings 
 The 2006 Freedom House ratings for Kyrgyzstan are presented in Table 1 below.  
The historical trend of Freedom House ratings is presented in Figure 2.  The scores are 
based on a scale of 1 to 7, with a rating of 1 indicating the highest degree of freedom and 
7 the least.  The Freedom House ratings process is based on a checklist of ten political 






5 4 Partly Free 
Table 1.  2005 Freedom House Ratings for Kyrgyzstan. 27 

























 Figure 2.  Historic Trend of Freedom House Ratings for Kyrgyzstan28 
                                                 
27 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2006”, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=6996 (November 2006). 
 15
 2.  Polity IV Metrics 
 Polity IV indicators for Kyrgyzstan are outlined in Table 2 and the historical trend 
is presented in Figure 3.  The variables for Table 2 are defined as follows: 
• Polity: Ranges from -10 to 10 (-10 = high autocracy; 10 = high democracy) 
• Democ: Ranges from 0 to 10.  Openness of political institutions (0 = low; 10 = 
high) 
• Autoc:  Ranges from 0 to 10.  Closedness of political institutions (0 = low; 10 = 
high). 
Polity DEMOC AUTOC 
-3 1 4 
Table 2.  2003 Polity IV Indicators - Kyrgyzstan.29 
 
Figure 3.  Annual Polity Scores for Kyrgyzstan.30 
                                                                                                                                                 
28 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2006”, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=6996 (November 2006). 
29 Polity IV Project.  “Polity IV Country Report – Kyrgyzstan”, 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/country_reports/Kyr1.htm (July 2006). 
30 Ibid. 
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 3. Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
 Finally, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) is a global ranking system 
that evaluates a country’s progress toward a market-based democracy in terms of political 
and economic performance.  The BTI reports two indices: democracy status and market 
economy status, with a higher score indicating more progress toward a market-based 
democracy.  The democracy status score is composed of five criteria, each evaluated on 
scale of one to ten:   
• Stateness:  clarity about the nation’s existence as a state, with adequately 
differentiated power structures 
• Political participation: the extent to which the population has political freedoms 
and determines who rules the country 
• Rule of law:  the extent to which state powers check and balance each other and 
ensure civil liberties 
• Stability of democratic institutions:  the capability of democratic institutions to 
perform and the extent to which they are accepted 
• Political and social integration:  the existence of stable patterns of representation 
for mediating between society and the state. 
Kyrgyzstan’s overall 2006 score for BTI democracy status is 4.08, which places it in the 
category of “moderate autocracy”.  The country’s overall score for 2003 was 3.8, placing 
it in the category of “autocracy”.  The breakdown for these scores is presented in Table 3.  
Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated slight improvement from 2003 to 2006, though it still 
remains moderately autocratic.  











2003 6.0 4.0 4.0 1.0 4.0 
2006 7.3 3.8 3.8 2.0 3.7 
Table 3.  BTI Democracy Status Indicators for Kyrgyzstan – 2003 and 2006. 31 
                                                 
31 Bertelsmann Transformation Index, “Bertelsmann Transformation Atlas”, http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/46.0.html?&L=1 (June 2006). 
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 4. Trend Toward Autocracy 
 The combination of Freedom House, Polity IV and BTI indicators clearly 
underscores the autocratic nature of the Kyrgyzstan regime.  Equally concerning, 
however, is the fact that the trend is not improving.  According to Freedom House, 
however, it is actually getting worse (see Figure 2).  Though the initial period of 
independence showed slight improvements in civil and political rights, the trend toward 
autocracy began in 1997 and the country slid into “Not Free” status in 2000.  Throughout 
the mid and late 1990s, President Akayev used numerous constitutional reforms to 
consolidate power in the executive branch.  The shift toward full autocracy was capped 
by the 2000 legislative and presidential elections, which, unlike the elections of the early 
1990s, were considered neither free nor fair.  Though the events surrounding the Tulip 
Revolution in 2005 marked a hopeful shift, the country is still ruled by an authoritarian 
regime with the trappings of democracy.  Further analysis of Kyrgyzstan’s transition 
process from communist rule will shed more light on this trend.    
C. TRANSITOLOGY APPROACH – THE POLITICAL TRANSITION FROM 
COMMUNISM 
 Analyzing Kyrgyzstan’s transition from communism to its current authoritarian 
regime from a transitology perspective can be somewhat complicated.  Multiple factors 
contributed to the steady rollback of democratic reforms in Kyrgyzstan throughout the 
1990s and early 2000s.  This section will analyze the impact of external pressures as well 
as domestic political dynamics on the state of democratic reforms in the country.  To do 
so, it is necessary to first summarize the key events since independence that shaped the 
country’s political destiny and then break down the most important causal factors.   
 1. From Communism to Kyrgyzstan’s Version of Democracy 
 Kyrgyzstan declared independence from the Soviet Union in August 1991.  Two 
months later, a divided parliament failed to elect the Communist Party first secretary as 
the country’s first president.  The parliament instead elected Askar Akayev, the president 
of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences and a champion of Gorbachev’s policies of 
measured reform.  Akayev introduced multiparty elections and embarked on economic 
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reforms, vowing to transform the country into the Switzerland of Central Asia.32  The 
country’s first post-Soviet constitution was adopted in 1993, creating a presidential 
system with a bicameral legislature composed of a 45-member People's Assembly (upper 
house) and a 60-seat Legislative Assembly (lower house).33  
 In the parliamentary elections of 1995, no party won a clear majority.  A mix of 
former communist officials, intellectuals and clan leaders captured most of the legislature 
seats.  Akayev won reelection later that year and in 1996 voters overwhelming approved 
amendments that substantially increased presidential powers, such as the power to 
dissolve parliament.  This increase in presidential power coincides roughly with the 
decline in Freedom House indicators for civil and political rights.   
 The elections of 2000 represented a further erosion of democratic norms.  
Opposition parties, including the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (PDMK), el Bei-
Bechora (The People’s Party) and Ar-Namys (Dignity) were barred from competing in 
the February parliamentary elections due to minor technicalities.  Furthermore, the 
chairman of Ar-Namys, Felis Kulov, ran as an independent candidate for parliament and 
lost in the runoff election by a conspicuously large margin despite having a substantial 
lead in the first round of elections.  International observers, including observers from the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) noted significant voting 
irregularities, including attempts to bribe voters, tabulation fraud, and state media bias.34  
The elections were deemed neither free nor fair.  The October 2000 presidential election 
was also seriously flawed. Leading opposition candidates were arrested or denied 
registration.  Additionally, international monitors again cited numerous voting 
irregularities (ballot box stuffing, biased media coverage, exclusion of opposition 
                                                 
32 Martha Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance (Washington:  Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2005), 41. 
33 Constitutional amendments adopted in February 2003 created a unicameral legislature with 75 
deputies after the 2005 parliamentary poll. 
34 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Election Observation Mission, Kyrgyz 
Republic: Parliamentary Elections, 20 February and 12 March 2000, Final Report (Warsaw: Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, April 10, 2000). 
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candidates). Kulov was subsequently arrested in 2002 on charges of abuse of power, 
forgery and complicity in committing a crime.  He was finally released in July 2005.          
 The run-up to the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2005 saw significant 
preparations by opposition parties to challenge Akayev’s authoritarian rule.  Several 
political blocs and coalitions were established throughout 2004.  With Kulov still 
incarcerated, a significant number of opposition groups supported former Prime Minister 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev for the October presidential elections.  Furthermore, it remained 
unclear if Akayev would amend the constitution and therefore be allowed to seek another 
term.  Kyrgyzstan held parliamentary elections in February 2005.  The OSCE monitored 
the elections and determined that once again they failed to comply with international 
norms for free and fair elections.   The OSCE similarly  
criticized the March runoff elections, though Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
observers deemed them free and fair.  Nevertheless, public perceptions of voter fraud in 
the runoff elections sparked sporadic protests, which erupted into massive demonstrations 
(the “Tulip Revolution”) and calls for Akayev’s government to resign.  President Akayev 
fled the country after protesters seized the presidential administration building.  In the 
aftermath, Bakiyev was named prime minister and acting president by the old legislature 
(elected in 2000).  Presidential elections were held in July 2005 and Bakiyev easily won 
with over 88 percent of the vote.  International observers noted significant improvements 
in the electoral process, but still reported some irregularities.    
 The argument can certainly be made that Kyrgyzstan’s regression toward 
autocracy had its roots in the move toward a superpresidential form of government in 
1996.  A superpresidential regime is characterized by an executive power that dwarfs the 
other branches of government in terms of resources and power, a president who enjoys 
decree powers, a legislature with little authority to challenge or impede presidential 
power, and constitutional provisions that make it virtually impossible to impeach the 
president.  Superpresidentialism is contrasted with autocracy only insofar as the president 
does not enjoy total power and is subject to periodic elections.35  Furthermore, the design 
                                                 
35 John Ishiyama and Ryan Kennedy, “Superpresidentialism and Political Party Development in 
Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Kygyzstan”, Europe-Asia Studies, 53, no. 8 (2001): 1178. 
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of the electoral system also had a detrimental effect.  The initial electoral system 
employed in Kyrgyzstan was based on single-member district plurality rules.  These 
systems generally impede development of political parties in comparison with those that 
employ proportional representation or a mixed system.  Indeed, in an analysis of political 
party development in post-Soviet states, political party development in Kyrgyzstan (in 
2000) ranked lower than Ukraine, Armenia and Russia.36      
 2. External Pressures 
 Martha Brill Olcott notes that by the mid-1990s, “partly under pressure from 
leaders of neighboring states, not to mention from his own family, President Akayev lost 
his enthusiasm for democratic reform and began to behave more like the other Central 
Asian rulers.”37 What was the extent of external pressure on Akayev with respect to 
democratic reforms?  More specifically, how much pressure and/or assistance did the 
United States provide for these reforms and why did it not yield any success?  This 
section will examine these questions in more detail.   
 Prior to September 11, the United States provided considerable assistance to 
Kyrgyzstan, much of which flowed through the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID).  From 1993 to 2001, the United States provided about $317 
million in assistance to Kyrgyzstan, primarily for economic development (see Figure 4 
below)   In 1994 the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), through a 
cooperative agreement with USAID, established an office in Kazakhstan to provide 
democracy assistance in Central Asia.  More offices were opened in other Central Asian 
states (to include Kyrgyzstan) in 1997.  The primary mission of the IFES was to focus on 
political party development, election monitoring and other election-related assistance.  
This continued to be the case through 1999, at which point USAID and IFES were forced 
to reassess their focus. According to an IFES report:  “It was at this time that IFES’s 
activities underwent a shift in focus to the promotion of civic education through a 
curriculum development project to improve instruction and information on democracy in 
                                                 
36 John Ishiyama and Ryan Kennedy, “Superpresidentialism and Political Party Development in 
Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Kygyzstan”, Europe-Asia Studies, 53, no. 8 (2001): 1185. 
37 Olcott (2005), 130. 
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secondary schools.”38  In essence, the new USAID approach was to help build 
“democracy from below” by emphasizing a more open democratic culture and focusing 
on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and more open media outlets.39   The 
rationale behind this shift was that democracy promotion in Central Asia was working, in 
practice, against the governments.  As long as the ruling regimes remained in power in 
Central Asia, democracy reform efforts would be seriously constrained.    





































Figure 4.  U.S. Security and Economic Assistance to Kyrgyzstan Prior to 2001.40 
 Kyrgyzstan also received considerable development assistance from international 
institutions.  The World Bank provided a substantial amount of funding, much of which 
was supposedly linked to progress on economic and political reform.  Kyrgyzstan became 
                                                 
38 Gina Gilbreth Holdar and David Ogle, Evaluation of IFES Civic Education Programs in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, prepared under contract AEP-I-820-00-00022-00 for USAID 
Central Asia Regional Mission (Jun 2003), 5. 
39 Sylvia Babus, “Democracy-Building in Central Asia Post-September 11”, in In the Tracks of 
Tamerlane – Central Asia’s Path to the 21st Century, ed. Daniel Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf 
(Washington D.C.:  National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 
2004), 120. 
40 USAID, http://www.usaid.org (Sep 2006) 
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a member of the World Bank and the International Development Association (IDA) in 
1992.  Since then, the IDA has committed about US$776 million for 38 projects in the 
country.41   Additionally, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank’s 
private sector development arm, has committed over US$49 million in its own funds for 
investment in Kyrgyzstan.42  Finally, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), as of December 2005, had signed over €174 million in 
investments, predominantly in the country’s private sector.  As Olcott points out, 
however, much of the aid that was linked to progress on democratic reforms came in the 
form of loans and not grants.  Though the country had the capacity to expand these 
reform projects, it did not have the capacity to repay debts.  This, she argues, is where the 
United States and other Western donors missed the opportunity to provide added 
financial assistance in one of the key areas of democratic reforms.43         
 The Bush administration’s new National Security Strategy and its emphasis on 
spreading democracy ushered in a new approach to linking assistance funds to democratic 
reforms.  However, the renewed security focus on Central Asia in the aftermath of 
September 11 seemed to work against this effort.  In March 2002 President Bush 
included key elements of a performance and incentive-based concept of foreign 
assistance in his proposed Millennium Challenge Account.  The program reflected 
impatience with undemocratic, non-reforming governments and sought to link assistance 
to demonstrated political will for democratic reforms.  However, the pressing need to 
provide security assistance to the Central Asian states in order to stem the threat of rising 
militant Islamism diminishes this new strategy of linking aid to reform.  Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State Lynn Pascoe’s testimony to Congress on U.S. policy in Central Asia 
summed up the paradox nicely: 
…we believe it is strongly in our national interest to engage fully with 
these governments to urge the political and economic reforms that we 
judge are essential to alleviate the conditions that breed terrorism…..It is 
extremely difficult to convince Central Asian leaders that long-term 
                                                 
41 World Bank, http://web.worldbank.org (Sep 2006).   
42 International Finance Corporation, http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/eca.nsf/Content/KyrgyzRepublic_Home 
(Sep 2006).   
43 Olcott (2005), 131. 
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economic and democratic reforms are necessary to  eliminate the roots of 
terrorism if we are not willing to help them counter terrorism in the short 
term and prove that we will be engaged for the long term.44  
 The end result is that the Bush administration continues to encourage reforms, but 
still refuses to firmly tie security assistance or economic development aid to 
demonstrated progress toward democracy. U.S. democracy assistance in Kyrgyzstan 
continues to prioritize civil society development, civic advocacy, political party 
development, parliamentary transparency and independent media.  However, very little of 
this assistance is geared toward direct engagement with the government.45  Though this is 
basically a necessity driven by past experience, it is important to realize the fact that it 
limits U.S. influence.  Even the influx of World Bank development funds and cautionary 
warnings that these funds are linked to reform hold little leverage in Central Asia.  As 
Kazakhstan’s political advisor, Ermukhamet Ertysbaev, noted following remarks a 
speech by the President of the World Bank in April 2002, “Foreign investors don’t care 
where they are investing money, be it a dictatorship or democracy.”46     
 On the other side of the coin, Akayev also faced pressure from neighboring states, 
namely Uzbekistan and Russia.  Though the pressure was significant, it is debatable 
whether it influenced him to turn away from his initial enthusiasm for democratic 
reforms.  As Kyrgyzstan’s primary trading partner, Russia’s leverage was tied to trade 
and foreign debt.  As the United States began basing aircraft at the newly constituted 
airbase near Bishkek, the Russian Duma cast aside a promise to reschedule Kyrgyzstan’s 
$133 million debt.  As a result, Akayev was forced to reassure Moscow that American 
bases would not conflict with Russian interests.47    
Additionally, Russia secured its own basing rights in the country.  Though the Kant 
airbase has limited military importance (only a limited number of aircraft and about 700 
personnel are based there), it provides an advanced post from which Moscow can exert 
                                                 
44 Babus (2004), 126. 
45 USAID, USAID/Kyrgyzstan Operational Plan FY 2006 – June 13, 2006, (USAID Development 
Experience Clearing House), 2-3. 
46 Ahmed Rashid, “Russia, China Warily Watch for American Intrusions in Central Asia”, Eurasia 
Insight, May 3, 2002, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050302.shtml, (Sep 2006) 
47 Ibid. 
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diplomatic leverage.48  Uzbekistan’s primary leverage over Kyrgyzstan lies in its role as 
the country’s primary energy supplier.  Kyrgyzstan imports most of its natural gas from 
Uzbekistan, most of which is governed by gas supply contracts involving barter deals of 
electricity, water and hard currency.  However, most of these deals have not worked in 
the long run, as Kyrgyzstan is often late in payment and Uzbekistan often cuts off the 
supply to force payment.   Uzbekistan cut of the supply in December 2000 and again in 
January and October of 2001.  The bottom line is that Uzbekistan and Russia continue to 
hold considerable leverage on the Kyrgyz government, but it is doubtful that this 
translates directly into pressure to abandon political reforms.  A much more plausible 
driving factor was simply Akayev’s recognition of the fact that Washington was much 
more concerned with fighting the War on Terror than in building democracy.  The 
establishment of a U.S. base in Uzbekistan all but confirmed that logic.  That being the 
case, much of the regime’s resistance to and abandonment of reform is likely due to 
domestic political factors, which is the subject of the next section.  
 3. Domestic Politics 
 Domestic political concerns lie at the heart of Akayev’s abandonment of political 
reforms.  What were his primary reasons for concentrating power and authority in the 
executive branch and how did he accomplish it?  These are the underlying questions 
addressed in this section.  Specifically, this section will cover the role of clan politics, the 
impact of corruption, and the role of Islam in terms of influencing Akayev’s political 
decisions.   
a.  The Impact of Clan Politics 
  A major factor in domestic politics in Kyrgyzstan is the role of clans.  
Identity is a key factor with respect to democracy in ethnically diverse states emerging 
from a communist legacy.  Indeed, Rustow’s transitology model lists only one requisite 
background condition for possible transition to democracy - national identity.49  The 
Kyrgyz ethnic group comprises approximately 65 percent of the population, with Uzbeks 
                                                 
48 Igor Torbakov, “Moscow Aims to Restore its Influence in Central Asia”, Eurasia Insight,  December 
5, 2002, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav120502a.shtml (Sep 2006). 
49 Rustow (1970), 350. 
 25
and Russians being the dominant minority groups (13.8 and 12.5 percent, respectively). 50  
However, clan politics seriously complicates the identity issue in Central Asia.  A clan is 
“an informal organization comprising a network of individuals linked by kin-based 
bonds.  Affective ties of kinship are its essence.”51  Kathleen Collins, in her study of clan 
politics in Central Asia, notes that three conditions give rise to regime durability via pacts 
between clans.  These conditions, which were all present in Kyrgyzstan as it gained 
independence, are 1) a shared external threat that induces cooperation, 2) a balance of 
power among the major clan factions and 3) a legitimate broker, or leader, assumes the 
role of maintaining the pact.52  Akayev assumed this role of broker and was backed by a 
strong clan coalition that formed to take power back from Moscow.  Kyrgyz identity is 
traditionally determined by ties with one of three clan groupings, known as “wings”.  
They are comprised of the Ong (the right), Sol (the left) and Ichkilik (neither right nor 
left).  The left wing includes seven clans in the north and west.  Among them, the Buguu 
clan provided the first administrators of the republic during the early Soviet era, but its 
influence declined after the purges of the 1930s and another northern clan, the Sarbagysh, 
gained dominant status.  Since Stalin’s reign, this clan has provided most of Kyrgyzstan’s 
leaders, including Akayev.  The right wing contains only one clan, the Advgine, which 
has its roots in the southern part of the country.  The Ichkilik, which also has strong links 
to southern Kyrgyzstan, is actually a group of many clans.  Collins argues that “If a 
transition takes place—instigated by an exogenous shock, such as independence—the 
informal pact will foster a durable transition but not a democratic one.”53  The evidence 
from Kyrgyzstan’s electoral process is compelling.  Akayev placed his kinsmen in 
positions of power as regional or local governors.  They, in turn, used the hierarchical 
networks of clan patronage to influence voters’ preferences.  The results of the 2000 
parliamentary election also give ample evidence of the dominant role of clans in 
Kyrgyzstan’s political system.  In that election, independents, primarily clan notables, 
                                                 
50CIA World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov (Mar 2006).  
51 Kathleen Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics, Evidence from Central Asian Trajectories”, World 
Politics, 56 (2004), 231. 
52 Ibid., 237. 
53 Ibid.  
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won 73 or 105 seats despite a reformed electoral law intended to give political parties 
more representation.54  Furthermore, informal power sharing arrangements among the 
northern and southern clan groupings helped maintain stability throughout the first 
decade of the country’s independence.  Much of the political unrest in the country since 
2002 is reportedly linked to the northern clan’s reluctance and/or inability to address 
complaints from the southern clan groups.55 
b. The Influence of Corruption 
  Coupled with the impact of clan politics is the pervasiveness of corruption 
in Kyrgyzstan, which undoubtedly influenced Akayev’s abandonment of democratic 
reforms.  Corruption in the public sector refers to the abuse of public office for private 
gain. High levels of corruption have been endemic in Central Asia since these countries 
gained independence and Kyrgyzstan under Akayev’s rule was certainly no exception.  
According to a 2003 television broadcast in Kyrgyzstan, “almost all people in Kyrgyzstan 
encounter extortion at schools, universities, police offices, hospitals, customs offices, 
state motor-vehicle and customs inspectorates.  Plants and factories encounter…bribery 
even more often than ordinary citizens.”56  Data reported by Transparency International 
underscore this point.  The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is reported annually by 
Transparency International and is based on polling data of business people and analysts 
collected by independent surveying institutions.   A CPI score of 10 represents a clean 
rating.  A CPI score less than 3 represents rampant corruption.  CPI scores for 2005 are 
presented in Table 4.  Of the 159 countries surveyed, Kyrgyzstan ranked 134th.  Relative 
to the other Central Asian Republics, Kyrgyzstan scored slightly better than Uzbekistan, 
but worse than Kazakhstan.  More importantly, all of the Central Asian states fall into the 
category of rampant corruption.  Moreover, a look at the historical data indicates that 
corruption in Kyrgyzstan has remained consistent.  Prior to the 2005 Transparency 
                                                 
54 Freedom House, “Nations in Transit 2006:  Kyrgyzstan”, 
http://www.freedomhouse.hu/nitransit/2006/kyrgyzstan2006.pdf (Nov 2006). 
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International report, the organization scored Kyrgyzstan only two other years, once in 
1999 and again in 2004.  Both years the country scored a rating of 2.2.57  Worse still, 
since Akayev’s ouster in 2005, the level of corruption appears to be worsening.  
According to one report, bribery rates have risen by 200 to 500 percent, as the new 
Bakiyev administration struggles to consolidate power and bureaucrats at all levels take 
advantage of their regulatory power.58 
Country 2005 Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) 
Ranking 
United States 7.6 17th 
Kazakhstan 2.6 110th 
Russia 2.4 128th 
Kyrgyzstan 2.3 134th 
Uzbekistan 2.2 143rd 
Tajikistan 2.1 150th 
Turkmenistan 1.8 157th  
Table 4.  2005 Corruption Perception Index Scores for Central Asian States.59 
c. The Impact of Islam in Kyrgyzstan Politics 
  Islam as an independent variable is a difficult concept.  Kyrgyzstan is 
about 80 percent Muslim and around 11 percent Russian Orthodox.60  Furthermore, the 
Muslim population is predominantly Sunni, adhering to the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam, 
the largest of the four schools of Islam and formerly the official school of the Ottomans.  
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The Hanafi school is generally considered to be the school most open to new ideas.61  
The classical Sunni political philosophy calls for a ruler that is, most importantly, 
Muslim.  Additionally, the ruler must be competent, willing to listen to religious scholars 
and establish law and order.  Moreover, a core political concern for modern Muslims is 
the desire to limit arbitrary personal rule and replace it with the rule of law.62  Of course, 
the Soviet legacies, along with nomadic and clan traditions, loom large with respect to the 
practice of Islam in Central Asia.63  Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
communist state discouraged the practice of all religions, stressing secular values over 
spirituality.   
  The end result is that Islam is definitely subordinate to secular concerns in 
Kyrgyzstan, even with respect to the political philosophy.  Only one-fifth of Muslims in 
the country assert that they constantly follow religious rules; 63 percent say they 
sometimes adhere to religious practices; and one-sixth do not engage in religious 
practices at all.64  In their attitudes toward democracy, 61 percent of the population 
believes that democracy is better than any other form of government; a response that does 
not vary between Muslims, Orthodox and non-believers.65 
  In general, the dominance of Islam in a particular state is defined by thee 
factors:  Islam’s status as the official state religion, the extent to which Islamic political 
parties exercise or share power, and the role of Islamic law in the country’s legal code.  
In looking at these three factors as they apply to Islam in Kyrgyzstan, it is clear that Islam 
does not play a major role in the political system.  The judicial system is based solely on 
civil law.  Furthermore, the Constitution and the law provide for freedom of religion and 
separation of church/mosque and state, though the government does restrict the activities 
of radical Islamic groups deemed a threat.  Finally, Article 8 of the Constitution prohibits 
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the formation of political parties based on religious or ethnic grounds.  The only 
subversive role played by Islam in the country’s political system is linked to radical 
Islamic groups that pose a threat to stability.  These groups include the non-violent Hizb-
ut-Tahrir, a group that advocates the peaceful overthrow of existing Central Asian 
governments and the reestablishment of a caliphate in the region that is guided by Islamic 
law.  Hizb-ut-Tahrir reportedly has about 3,000 members in Kyrgyzstan.66 
 4. Summary 
 In general, Kyrgyzstan’s transition from communist rule showed signs of promise 
and then eventual regression and disappointment.  The election of Akayev over 
communist candidates offered great promise for democratic reforms in Kyrgyzstan since 
this represented a shift in the balance of power away from the ancien régime.  The 
regression away from full democratization is certainly due to political decisions made by 
President Akayev and other political elites, but societal pressure for reform was lacking 
until 2005.  In her analysis of Kyrgyzstan’s transition from communist rule, Martha 
Olcott makes the point that the United States missed a prime opportunity to pressure the 
Akayev regime to turn the corner with democratic reforms in time for the 2005 
parliamentary elections.  She notes that U.S. incentives (in the form of increased aid and 
possibly contracts for Kyrgyz companies in the reconstruction of Afghanistan) could 
have convinced Akayev to uphold democratic norms.  Instead, she argues, Washington 
chose not to prioritize democratization and refused to divert the necessary attention and 
resources to influence Akayev’s behavior.67  The data presented above, however, calls 
this argument into question.  Domestic political factors played a much more dominant 
role in terms of pushing Akayev away from democratic reforms.  The power of clan 
politics and the pervasive corruption in Kyrgyzstan were the real driving forces that 
shaped Akayev’s moves to consolidate and concentrate power in the executive branch.  
 Of course, this type of transitology analysis ignores questions about the structural 
foundation for democracy and whether this was sufficient for democracy to thrive in 
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Kyrgyzstan in the first place.  Are political choices alone the reason for democracy’s 
failure in Kyrgyzstan; or was the country simply ill-suited, structurally, for democracy to 
begin with?  The following section will address this structural side of the debate.   
D. ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
 In his analysis of the transitology approach, Thomas Carothers is highly critical of 
the tendency of scholars to banish the idea that there are structural pre-conditions for 
democracy, arguing that a country’s chances of democratizing are strongly influenced by 
underlying economic, social and institutional conditions.68  This section will analyze the 
critical structural variables that are often referred to as the foundation for democracy.  A 
key part of this is an examination of economic development and the country’s transition 
toward a market economy.  Also, education levels, urbanization and income distribution 
are important insofar as they related to the development of a middle class.  Finally, civic 
institutions and societal attitudes toward democracy are essential for generating 
opposition parties and support for democracy.      
 1. Economic Development Factors 
The experiences of countries in East and Southeast Asia confirm the complex 
interconnection between politics and economics.  In other words, it is impossible to 
liberalize the economy without liberalizing public life as well.   Even President Jian 
Zemin of China declared during his visit to the United States in November 1997: “We 
believe that, without democracy, there can be no modernization.”69  For these reasons, it 
is important to look at Kyrgyzstan’s economic development as well as its reform process.  
Comparative economic indicators for Kyrgyzstan (2005 figures) are presented in Table 3 
below.  Education and other human development indicators are presented in Table 4.  
While Gross Domestic Product (GDP), unemployment, and poverty figures relate directly 
to economic development, the GINI Index quantifies the level of income distribution.70  
The Human Development index is a composite index that combines measurements in life 
                                                 
68 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy, 13, no. 1 (2002), 
15-7. 
69 The New Republic, 24 November 1997, 45. 
70 The GINI Index is based on a comparison between actual income distribution and uniform income 
distribution.  Perfect distribution of income would equate to GINI Index of 100. 
 31
expectancy, education indicators, and standard of living figures.  The education index 
measures a country’s relative achievement in adult literacy as well as enrollment in 
primary, secondary and tertiary education.  In general, the figures present a bleak view of 
the Kyrgyz economy; the country has poor economic growth, high unemployment and 
excessive poverty.  On the other hand, the living standards indicators reflect the fact that 
Kyrgyzstan represents a medium level of development relative to many other developing 
countries, as classified by the Human Development Report.  However, the current state of 
economic development is only part of the overall picture and the statistics fail to capture 
the entire story; it is also important to examine Kyrgyzstan’s transition from a soviet-
style command economy toward a market-oriented system.    








Kyrgyzstan 2% $2,100 18% 29 40% 
United States 3.5% $41,800 5.1% 45 12% 
Russia 6.4% $11,100 7.6% 40 17.8% 
Uzbekistan 7.2% $1,800 0.7%* 26.8 28% 
Mongolia 6.2% $1,900 6.7% 44 36.1% 
  * Note:  Official statistic, but underemployment is reportedly 20%.  
Table 5.  Kyrgyzstan Economic Indicators.71 












Kyrgyzstan 0.702 82% 0.93 34.0% 
United States 0.939 92% 0.97 79.8% 
Russia 0.795 88% 0.95 73.3% 
Uzbekistan 0.709 76% 0.91 36.8% 
Mongolia 0.679 74% 0.90 46.1% 
Table 6.  Kyrgyzstan Living Standards Indicators.72 
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 The collapse of the Soviet Union was devastating to the economies of the newly 
independent states; this was especially the case in Kyrgyzstan.  In 1990, approximately 
98 percent of Kyrgyz exports were destined for other parts of the Soviet Union.73  As a 
result, the country’s economic performance following the Soviet collapse was worse than 
any other republic except Armenia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan (which were all racked by 
war).  By 1996, Kyrgyzstan’s GDP had decreased to 53.1 percent of the 1990 level.  The 
total volume of industrial and gross agricultural output had declined to 38.8 percent and 
64.5 percent of the 1990 levels, respectively.74  These declines seriously impeded the 
transition to a market economy.    
 Nevertheless, the country did undertake significant reform efforts.  Following the 
collapse of the ruble zone in 1993, Kyrgyzstan became the first CIS country to establish 
its own currency, with the help of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) macro-
stabilization program.  Additionally, the country’s privatization of small and medium 
sized enterprises (SME) is essentially complete.  The level of privatization of SMEs 
reached over 70 percent by 2004, and this sector engages approximately 60 percent of the 
population.75  There are still, however, a number of large state-owned enterprises, 
including utilities, agribusiness and mining, as well as some in the tourist industry.  
Tables 5 and 6 below highlight Kyrgyzstan’s successful economic reform process.  For 
these tables, a value of 1 indicates little or no progress; a value of 4.3 indicates standards 
similar to advanced economies.  The country’s progress on reforms is impressive; 
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Table 8.  Kyrgyzstan Economic Transition Indicators (2003).77  
 In spite of the country’s successful transition program, it still suffers from 
economic decline.  Expectations that rapid liberalization of the economy would produce 
economic prosperity in the future were not unfounded or unrealistic.  However, these 
results never materialized.  Kyrgyzstan’s free trade policy, for instance, was 
economically viable, but the country could not secure support for it from Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan or Russia, because none of these states was interested in opening their 
markets to Kyrgyz goods.78  As the country worked to achieve stabilization in the early 
1990s, with an emphasis on reducing the level of inflation, it created an artificially high 
exchange rate for the Kyrgyz som.  The result was an unfavorable balance of payments 
problem and reliance on international financial agencies (foreign credits and loans) to 
maintain the economy.  Although the Paris Club eased Kyrgyzstan’s debt burden in 
March 2002, its external debt still exceeds $2 billion, about 93 percent of its GDP.  
Furthermore, over $190 million of this debt is owed to Russia.  The major donors for 
Kyrgyzstan’s external debt are the World Bank and the IMF, accounting for over $750 
million of the country’s debt.79        
                                                 
76 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), EBRD Transition Report 2003  
77 Ibid. 
78 Olcott (2005), 41-2. 
79 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic  (16 Nov 
2004), 1. 
 34
The economic road ahead for Kyrgyzstan remains uncertain.  The country’s 
biggest challenge is the reduction of poverty, which is especially acute in the southern 
population.  Furthermore, its reform process continues.  The country introduced wide-
reaching agricultural reforms designed to spark private sector participation, but growth in 
this sector is limited.  Kyrgyzstan also took steps to boost foreign investment in its gold 
and hydroelectric industries, with varying degrees of success.  Infrastructure reform also 
remains a priority.  As indicated above in Table 5, this represents the least successful 
aspect of the country’s transition process.  Kyrgyzstan’s infrastructure is characterized by 
a generally low quality of services and inefficiency, requiring extensive investment.  
Furthermore, the public sector has not been able to carry out upgrades and maintenance 
due to fiscal constraints.   The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) transition strategy for Kyrgyzstan recommends further reforms to advance 
commercialization of infrastructure services.80  In the end, Kyrgyzstan economists view 
the future through a less than optimistic lens, failing a dramatic change in the investment 
and trade climate in the region.  Though the dream of becoming a Central Asian 
Switzerland is gone, it still sees itself as the doorway to China, since Kyrgyzstan  
and China are the only WTO members in the region.  However, accession of Russia and 
Kazakhstan to the WTO will circumvent this scenario, as the old Soviet rail system 
favors both of these countries over Kyrgyzstan.81        
 In general, economic development indicators provide intriguing data, but fail to 
sufficiently illuminate the reasons for democracy’s failure in Kyrgyzstan.  Economic 
indicators such as per capita GDP, poverty and inflation rates clearly point to a distressed 
economy, but the pace of economic reforms puts the country on track to achieve a fully 
market-oriented economy, which provides the best hope for recovery and growth of a 
middle class and civil society in the country.  Furthermore, comparison of Kyrgyzstan’s 
economic indicators with other developing countries highlights the fact that these 
economic factors are not necessarily causal with respect to democracy.  Mongolia and 
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Moldova, for instance, are also economically distressed but have slightly better records 
with respect to democracy. 
 2. Societal Attitudes and Civil Society 
 Coupled with economic performance, prospects for democracy are also intimately 
linked to societal attitudes and beliefs as well as the emergence and development of civil 
society.  This analysis will focus on attitudes about democracy, and the interaction 
between the state and civil society in Kyrgyzstan.   
 Voter participation and societal attitudes toward democracy are two key indicators 
of the structural foundation for democracy, especially in emerging democracies.  In 
Kyrgyzstan, the voting trend indicates strong popular support for democratic ideals.  
Voter participation figures for Kyrgyzstan’s presidential and parliamentary elections are 
presented in Figure 2 below and show strong participation across the board, though this 
may be a hold-over from mandatory voter participation laws in the Soviet Union.  More 
importantly, studies on societal attitudes toward democracy are also relatively positive.  
In his study on societal views about democracy in Kyrgyzstan, Richard Rose found that 
relatively strong support for democratic ideals and democratic governance cut across 
religious and socioeconomic lines.  Social divisions within society had the strongest 
influence on support for democracy in his study.  For example, 53 percent of the 
minimally educated Kyrgyz supported democracy, while 69 percent of the higher 
educated supported it.82      
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Figure 5.  Kyrgyzstan Voter Participation Trends.83 
 Civil Society is also a key factor in determining democracy’s chance for birth and 
survival.  Indeed, Robert Putnam postulated that even non-political organizations in civil 
society are vital for democracy because they build social capital, trust and shared 
values.84  Like most post-communist states, Kyrgyzstan embarked upon independence 
without a strong civil society.  Nevertheless, today’s Kyrgyzstan boasts one of the most 
vibrant civil societies in the entire region.  The general perception of civil society in 
Central Asia is that its development is hampered by traditions such as deference to 
authority, kinship-based allegiances and Islam.  Furthermore, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) in Kyrgyzstan are perceived as existing only at the initiative and 
expense of the West.  In her in-depth analysis of civil society in Kygyzstan, Kelly 
McMann rebuts these misperceptions.85 Instead, she notes that the dominant influences 
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on civil society in Kyrgyzstan are Soviet economic legacies and economic 
underdevelopment.  Party-state ownership of municipal buildings results in civic 
organizations looking to the state for office space and facilities.  Furthermore, the 
country’s dire economic conditions translate into less opportunity for developing 
alternative resources.  In the end, however, civic leaders’ desire for state assistance, she 
argues, bodes well for Kyrgyzstan.  Cooperation between NGOs and governments tends 
to foster political and economic development.  The challenge is for the civic 
organizations to convince the government of the importance of cooperation while 
maintaining their independence from the state.  There is ample evidence, however, of the 
growing influence of Kyrgyzstan’s civic realm. The For Reforms coalition, comprising 
roughly 20 political parties and NGOs, organized a mass protest on May 27, 2006 to call 
for accelerated reforms.86   
E. CONCLUSION 
In the end, what does this analysis reveal?  Conventional wisdom dictates that the 
transition from communism to democracy must begin with economic reform in order to 
build a foundation for democratic reforms.  Indeed, most post-Soviet states embarked on 
economic reforms in tandem with the introduction of democratic institutions.  Initially, 
Kyrgyzstan followed this pattern as well.  The election of Akayev, a reform-minded 
academic, was accompanied by market-oriented economic reforms and the promise of 
democratic reforms.  However, several factors combined to derail this plan as Akayev 
established an autocratic regime.  The influence of external actors failed to push Akayev 
aggressively enough to force him further down the path toward democratic reform.  The 
United States, in particular, failed to ensure that development aid was concretely tied to 
progress on reform.  Furthermore, it is clear that U.S. security concerns in the post- 
September 11 world put democracy building as a secondary priority behind fighting 
terrorism in the region, a fact easily discerned by leaders in the region, including Akayev.  
Furthermore, the impact of other external actors, such as Uzbekistan and Russia, was also 
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relatively inconsequential in terms of Akayev’s choice to abandon democratic reforms.  
The real driving force for Akayev was the combination of clan politics and the rampant 
culture of corruption within the government.  The consolidation of clan politics helped 
stabilize a manipulated form of democracy, with Akayev as the main broker of the 
dominant clan.  Additionally, the fledgling civil society and middle class in Kyrgyzstan 
was simply incapable of mounting a concerted opposition effort against government 
resources.  The old cliché that absolute power corrupts absolutely seems appropriate in 
describing Akayev’s abandonment of his ideals with respect to democracy.    
Analysis of structural factors produces a complex set of results.  Although the 
country has made significant progress toward a market-oriented economy, economic 
underdevelopment and poverty remain.  This certainly stifles the development of a 
middle class segment in the country, but it also hampers the development of a fully 
independent civil society.  Together, these two factors provide a synergy that enabled 
Akayev to smother the development of democracy with little resistance from the public.  
Nevertheless, an embryonic civil society does exist in Kyrgyzstan, with growing 
influence and the ability to organize mass demonstrations.  Furthermore, overall support 
for democracy remains fairly strong within society, cutting across religious and socio-
economic lines.  Also, Islam remains a non-factor in Kyrgyzstan’s political system and 
has had no detrimental effect on democracy.  The secularization of Kyrgyz society is 
largely due to a lasting Soviet legacy and Central Asian traditions, making it difficult for 
political Islam to establish a strong foothold.  The bottom line is that economic and 
structural indicators alone do not adequately explain democracy’s failure, but they 
certainly enabled Akayev to have a freer hand in concentrating power in the executive 
branch.     
On a positive note, democracy does seem to be just around the corner in 
Kyrgyzstan as opposition parties are still active and civil dissatisfaction with the regime 
continues to mount.  Of course, this seems to have been the case since Kyrgyzstan gained 
independence in 1991; and many could argue that nothing has really changed.  Autocratic 
rule remains entrenched and the regime continues to manipulate electoral campaigns by 
barring and/or jailing opposition candidates.  The only real hope for democratic reforms 
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seems to be further development of the middle class segment of society and international 
pressure to reform electoral procedures and tackle the massive corruption at all levels of 
government.  This holds the promise for more effective civic society and, subsequently, 
more public pressure on the government to institute real political reforms.  The 
November 2006 protests in Kyrgyzstan over the delayed drafting of constitutional 
reforms have the potential to be help transition the country toward more democratic 
governance.  The question remains, however, whether the forces pushing for 
constitutional change can overcome the entrenched forces of clan politics and corruption.  
How does this analysis relate to U.S. policy options?  In general, assisting or 
promoting democracy requires patience, a long-term commitment and a multi-
dimensional approach.  There are various avenues which can help bolster democracy in a 
country, but it is important to acknowledge that these methods are not without pitfalls.  
Working to build-up civil society, for instance, does not guarantee that the result will 
favor democracy.  Some civil associations may even hinder democracy if they place their 
own interests over political freedom.  The majority of democracy assistance programs 
focus on procedural democracy, working to ensure free and fair electoral processes.87  
These also can prove lacking, as states may hold frequent and fair elections but suppress 
civil society and restrict freedom of information.  Finally, economic development aid 
may help build a middle class, but does not necessarily empower that segment of society 
to demand political reforms.  If the United States and now NATO can gain a more secure 
environment in Afghanistan, the impetus for embracing regimes in Central Asia without 
regard to their progress on democratic reform will begin to wane.  Then and only then 
can the United States exert real pressure on Kyrgyzstan’s leadership and link 
development aid to performance on political reform.    
The key to promoting democracy in Central Asia is deciding between the various 
methods available and balancing those with limited resources.  The 2006 U.S. National 
Security Strategy acknowledges the fact that each of the five Central Asian Republics 
requires a unique foreign policy approach.  It also affirms that these policies form part of 
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a larger strategy for the entire region:  “we must pursue those elements simultaneously:  
promoting effective democracies and the expansion of free-market reforms, diversifying 
global sources of energy, and enhancing security and winning the War on Terror.”88  
Moreover, President Bush also acknowledged that every state moves at its own pace 
toward a democratic form of governance. 
Every nation that travels the road to freedom moves at a different pace, 
and the democracies they build will reflect their own culture and 
traditions.  But the destination is the same: a free society where people live 
at peace with each other and at peace with the world.89 
In Kyrgyzstan, the EBRD and the IMF are aiding in economic development, which will 
hopefully strengthen civil society and the middle class.  The major focus for fostering 
democratic reforms should be on procedural aspects.  Kyrgyz civic and opposition groups 
are active and demanding reforms, but the government continues to corrupt the electoral 
process.  It will continue to pursue this course until pressured by outside forces or internal 
opposition to allow greater procedural democracy.  However, the Bakiyev administration 
has not yet consolidated its power base in Kyrgyzstan and should be much more 
susceptible to external pressure from the United States.  Furthermore, the United States 
can afford to be bolder in trying to build political opposition in the country in the hope of 
furthering the path toward democracy.  There are already signs that the United States is 
working to destabilize Bakiyev’s government.90  This type of bold pressure is exactly 
what is needed to force reform to the surface.  However, it must be carefully gauged and 
tangible moves toward political reforms must be quickly followed with substantial 
amounts of development aid.       
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IV. UZBEKISTAN CASE STUDY 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 While Kyrgyzstan may have presented a high degree of hope for democracy as 
the states in Central Asia gained independence, the same cannot be said of Uzbekistan.  
Islam Karimov, the country’s first and only president since the Soviet Union collapsed, 
was a communist technocrat by background and was handpicked by Gorbachev to lead 
the Uzbek republic during the perestroika era.  In the last years of Soviet rule, Uzbekistan 
was beginning to show signs of an emerging culture of political participation.  Two pro-
democracy political parties, Birlik (Unity) and Erk (Liberty), began to emerge as 
opposition parties to Karimov’s Popular Democratic Party, which was essentially a 
renamed version of the former Communist Party.  Karimov was overwhelmingly elected 
the country’s first president in 1991 against an opposition candidate from Erk.  After 
eliminating reform-minded rivals within his own party in early 1992 with the dismissal of 
onetime vice president Mirsaidov, Karimov forced the leaders of Birlik and Erk into exile 
and effectively destroyed the parties.  Since then, only pro-government opposition parties 
(as oxymoronic as that may sound) have been allowed to compete in elections.  
Moreover, Karimov completely banned religion-based political parties for fear of rising 
Islamic fundamentalism in the country.  Throughout the 1990s, Karimov continued to 
repress political opposition and basically shun Western criticism of the country’s non-
existent reform efforts.   
 The new geopolitical environment in Central Asia after September 11 brought 
renewed hope for reform in Uzbekistan.  However, despite increased aid and diplomatic 
efforts, the country remained resistant to overtures from the West and Karimov remained 
recalcitrant about the repression of all political opposition.  The expulsion of U.S. troops 
from the base at Karshi-Kanabad in 2005 following U.S. criticism of the Andijon 
massacre is a clear indication that Karimov is in no hurry to implement meaningful 
democratic reforms or submit to U.S. influence. 
 Karimov is clearly the major obstacle to democracy in Uzbekistan.  This chapter 
will examine the major factors that have influenced Karimov’s moves to consolidate 
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power in Uzbekistan and stymie political reforms.  To accomplish this, the research will 
examine the role of external actors as well as the role of domestic influences, to include 
political Islam, corruption and clan politics.  Furthermore, it is important to analyze the 
structural foundations (economic development, class structure, and civil society) in the 
country insofar as they relate to the public’s ability to demand and/or embrace reform.   
 Data for this case study will include both primary and secondary sources.  
Economic development and class structure indicators will be derived primarily from 
World Bank and IMF sources.  Assessments of civil society in Uzbekistan will rely 
primarily on academic analysis.  Analysis of the factors shaping Karimov’s drive to 
concentrate power and suppress political reform will be based largely on academic 
analysis.  The end goal of this chapter is to identify the major forces that influenced 
Uzbekistan’s path toward autocracy and posit alternative mechanisms that the United 
States might consider to bring about reform.       
B. STATE OF DEMOCRACY 
 Democracy is evaluated by examining Freedom House, Polity IV, and 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index metrics.  These provide a comprehensive evaluation 
of the country’s democratic institutions, the degree to which power is shared within the 
government, and the extent of political representation by the people.  Uzbekistan’s ratings 
below clearly illustrate that the country’s political institutions are largely subject to the 
interests of the ruling elite.      
 1. Freedom House Ratings 
 The 2006 Freedom House ratings for Uzbekistan are presented in Table 9.  Scores 
are based on a checklist of ten political rights questions and fifteen civil liberties 
questions.   Ratings range from 1 to 7 (1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 
the least).  Uzbekistan received the worst possible ratings.  The historical Freedom House 
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Table 9.  2005 Freedom House Ratings for Uzbekistan. 91. 

























































Figure 6.  Historic Trend of Freedom House Ratings for Uzbekistan.92 
 2. Polity IV Metrics 
 Polity IV indicators for Uzbekistan are outlined in Table 10 and the historical 
trend for the country’s polity scores is presented in Figure 7.  Again, the variables are 
defined as follows: 
• Polity: Ranges from -10 to 10 (-10 = high autocracy; 10 = high democracy) 
• Democ: Ranges from 0 to 10.  Openness of political institutions (0 = low; 10 = 
high) 
                                                 
91 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2006- Uzbekistan”, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=7086 (Nov 2006).  
92 Ibid.  
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• Autoc:  Ranges from 0 to 10.  Closedness of political institutions (0 = low; 10 = 
high). 
Polity DEMOC AUTOC 
-9 0 9 
Table 10.  2003 Polity IV Indicators – Uzbekistan. 93 
 
Figure 7. Annual Polity Scores for Uzbekistan.94 
 3. Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
 Finally, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) is a global ranking system 
that evaluates a country’s progress toward a market-based democracy in terms of political 
and economic performance.  The BTI reports two separate indices: democracy status and 
market economy status.  A higher score indicates more progress toward a market-based 
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http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/country_reports/Uzb1.htm (Aug 2006).  
94 Ibid.  
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democracy.  The democracy status score is composed of five criteria evaluated on scale 
of one to ten:   
• Stateness:  clarity about the nation’s existence as a state, with adequately 
differentiated power structures 
• Political participation:  the extent to which the population has political freedoms 
and determines who rules the country 
• Rule of law:  the extent to which state powers check and balance each other and 
ensure civil liberties 
• Stability of democratic institutions:  the capability of democratic institutions to 
perform and the extent to which they are accepted 
• Political and social integration:  the existence of stable patterns of representation 
for mediating between society and the state. 
Uzbekistan’s overall 2006 score for BTI democracy status is 3.13, which places it in the 
category of “autocracy”.  This score is virtually unchanged from the previous score 
reported in 2003 (3.0).  The breakdown for these scores is presented in Table 3 below and 
clearly indicates that the country is making very little progress toward democratic rule.  











2003 8.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 
2006 6.8 1.8 2.6 2.0 2.7 
Table 11.  BTI Democracy Status Indicators for Uzbekistan – 2003 and 2006. 95 
 4. Trend Toward Autocracy 
 The combination of Freedom House and Polity IV indicators underscores the fact 
that Uzbekistan is ruled by a completely authoritarian regime.  In relative terms, the 
situation can get no worse.  The initial period of independence showed flickering hopes 
for democracy, as evident by Freedom House’s “Partly Free” rating of 1991.  This hope, 
however, was extinguished by 1992; and the country has remained consistently 
authoritarian ever since.   The country’s constitution provides for a presidential system 
                                                 
95 Bertelsmann Transformation Index, “Bertelsmann Transformation Atlas”,   http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/atlas.0.html?&L=1 (Aug 2006). 
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with a formal separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches. In practice, though, the executive branch under Karimov dominates all aspects 
of political life.  It controls and represses civil society as well as all opposition 
movements.   Moreover, opposition parties are systematically denied registration and 
freedom of the media is nonexistent. The constant Polity IV score of -9 is indicative of 
these facts.  However, to analyze the factors that influenced the development of this 
polity in Uzbekistan, it is necessary to examine the transition process from communism 
in more detail.      
C. TRANSITOLOGY APPROACH – THE POLITICAL TRANSITION FROM 
COMMUNISM 
 
 A transitology analysis of Uzbekistan’s transition from communism to the current 
regime is not nearly as complicated as analyzing the transition in Kyrgyzstan.  The key 
factors that shaped Karimov’s concentration of power in the early 1990s are essentially 
domestic in nature, though external factors played an auxiliary role as well.  This section 
will analyze the impact of external pressures as well as domestic political dynamics on 
Karimov’s steady repression of political opposition and civil society.  To do so, however, 
it is first necessary to summarize the key events since independence that shaped the 
nature of Karimov’s hold on power.     
 1. From Communism to Autocracy 
 Uzbekistan’s transition from communism began on December 29, 1991 when 
over 98 percent of the country’s electorate approved a referendum on independence.  In a 
parallel vote, Islam Karimov was elected the country’s first president with an 
overwhelming 88 percent of the vote.  Karimov’s only opposition in this election was 
Mohammed Solih from the Erk Party, who challenged the results and charged election 
fraud.  After the election, Solih was arrested briefly and then released; he fled Uzbekistan 
and went into exile in 1992.  The Erk had a strong pan-Turkist tendency and was able to 
reach agreement with the country’s leadership and register as a political party.96  The 
main opposition group, Birlik, was the first political grouping in the country outside of 
                                                 
96 Shireen Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence (London: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 1996), 51. 
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communism.  It was founded in November 1988 with the initial goal of reviving the 
Uzbek language and culture while seeking greater sovereignty (not independence) for 
Uzbekistan.  However, it was barred from the election and later refused legal registration 
as a political party.  Religious-based political parties were banned entirely out of fear of 
militant, political Islam.   
 Karimov’s administration proposed a new constitution in September 1992 that 
outlined a system in which the president would act as head of state and of the government 
and be popularly elected to a five-year term.  It also limited the president to no more than 
two consecutive terms and called disbandment of the existing parliament in favor of a 
smaller legislature.  Parliament approved the new constitution unanimously in December 
1992.  Further constitutional revision in May 1993 also served to concentrate power in 
the executive branch.  Karimov reorganized the cabinet of ministers, combining the posts 
of president and chair of the cabinet of ministers.     
 Elections for the first post-Soviet legislature, the Oly Majlis, were held in 
December 1994 and January 1995 and marked a further consolidation of Karimov's hold 
on power.  Only one other party besides Karimov’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the 
Fatherland Progress, was allowed to compete in the elections.  Fatherland Progress was 
composed of members of the urban-based intelligentsia and the business community who 
were essentially supportive of Karimov and the PDP.  Regional political organizations 
were also allowed to submit candidate nominations.  The results were telling in terms of 
Karimov’s control of the institution.  Almost 95 percent of the deputies in the new 
legislature were former Communist Party members and candidates nominated by regional 
political organizations won nearly two-thirds of the seats.  On its second day in session, 
the Oly Majlis voted to conduct a popular referendum to extend Karimov’s term of 
office.  In March 1995 the country approved this referendum (allegedly by 99 percent) 
and extended Karimov’s first five-year term in office until 2000.     
 A series of bombings in Tashkent in February 1999 brought about even more 
repression of political opposition.  The regime blamed the explosions on radical Islamic 
groups and Karimov’s administration began eliminating potential and actual religious 
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opposition, arresting over 7,000 “religious extremists”.97  In the December 1999 
parliamentary election, five parties competed; and the election was strongly criticized by 
international election observers.  All of these parties supported Karimov and differed 
little in their political platforms.  In the January 2000 presidential election, Karimov 
defeated his only opponent, Abdulhasiz Dzhalalov – a Marxist history professor, 
garnering 92 percent of the vote.   
 Karimov continued to consolidate power and repress political opposition in the 
post-September 11 climate.  In January 2002 voters overwhelmingly (allegedly by 91 
percent) approved a nationwide referendum to extend the presidential term from five to 
seven years, taking Karimov’s term to 2007.  Voters also approved a constitutional 
change to replace the 250-member, single chamber Oly Majlis with a bicameral 
parliament consisting of a 120-seat lower house (with members elected by popular vote 
for five-year terms) and a 100-member upper house (with 84 representatives elected by 
regional councils and 16 appointed by the president).  International observers reported 
serious concerns about the validity of the referendum.  Finally, in April 2003 the 
parliament approved legislation that provided former presidents with immunity from 
prosecution.  Elections for the lower house of the new parliament were held in December 
2004.  Only the five pro-government parties were allowed to participate and opposition 
groups (including the Erk and Birlik) boycotted the election.  OSCE observers criticized 
the voting as falling significantly short of international standards for democratic 
elections.98   
 2. External Pressures 
 Olcott characterizes the political system of Uzbekistan as “fundamentally 
different from that of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and much less responsive to influence 
from the outside.”99  But how and why has Karimov remained so resistant to external 
influence?  Moreover, with respect to political reform, what was the real extent of 
                                                 
97 Olcott (2005), 49. 
98 Freedom House, “Country Report – Uzbekistan (2006)”, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=7086  (Sep 2006).   
99 Olcott (2005), 148. 
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external pressure on Karimov’s regime, both before and after September 11?  This 
section will examine these questions in detail.   
 Prior to September 11, economic and military aid from the United States was 
relatively limited due to concerns over Uzbekistan’s human rights record and lack of 
progress toward democratic reform.  Three interrelated factors made successive U.S. 
administrations wary of supporting Uzbekistan:  the absence of a strategy of democratic 
reforms and economic liberalization, the perceived absence of geostrategic assets, and the 
priority given to relations with Russia.100  The impact of these factors can be seen in the 
amount of aid received by the different Central Asian states before and after the 
September 11 attacks.  Before September 11, despite Uzbekistan’s position as the most 
populated and militarily powerful state in Central Asia, the United States gave the 
country little priority.  Figure 8 below tracks total U.S. economic assistance to Central 
Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan received 
the lion’s share of economic assistance among Central Asian states prior to the 
September 11 attacks.  In fact, even Tajikistan (and sometimes Turkmenistan) garnered 
more economic assistance than Uzbekistan in the pre-September 11 environment.  The 
story was much the same with respect to U.S. military aid to the region.  As depicted in 
Figure 9, the entire region warranted very little attention in terms of military aid prior to 
the September 11 attacks.  Uzbekistan warranted even less attention.  The country gained 
a dominant position relative to the other countries only after the Global War on Terror 
began.   
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Figure 8.  U.S. Economic Assistance to Central Asia – 1991 to 2004.101 



























































Figure 9.  U.S. Total Military Assistance to Central Asia – 1991 to 2004.102 
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 The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) began 
providing assistance to Uzbekistan in 1992.  Since then, it has committed more than $300 
million in programs to support Uzbekistan’s democratic institutions, social sector, and 
economic growth. These are typically implemented in the form of contracts and grants by 
local and international organizations.103 Additionally, in 1994 the International 
Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), through a cooperative agreement with USAID, 
established an office in Kazakhstan to provide democracy assistance in Central Asia.  In 
1999 USAID and IFES refocused their efforts across the region by targeting NGOs and 
more open media outlets.   However, political concerns over the lack of progress on 
reform influenced the amount of assistance provided to Uzbekistan.  As illustrated in 
Figure 10, USAID funding to Uzbekistan tended to lag behind that to Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, except for a brief window of increased funding related to the War on Terror.       
Development assistance from international institutions to Uzbekistan has also 
been limited due to Karimov’s resistance to implementing reforms.  After the country 
gained independence, Karimov insisted that his country not rush into drastic privatization 
and reform programs, instead opting to proceed slowly and try to find Uzbekistan’s own 
unique model for reform and development.  Karimov was hesitant to borrow from 
international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, fearing it would 
undermine the country’s independence.  The country did not seek IMF credits until 
financial difficulties forced Karimov’s hand in 1994.104  In 1991 the EU established a 
credit line of $1.626 billion for the former Soviet republics to help restructure their 
economic systems.  Uzbekistan did not sign an agreement with the EU to receive its share 
of this credit line until 1994.  As of December 2005, the EBRD had signed investments in 
Uzbekistan totaling €599 million, helping to generate another €877 million from other 
sources.105  However, the EBRD is currently restricting its investments to private sector 
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activities due to the country’s lack of commitment to promoting democracy and market 
reforms.      

























































Figure 10.  Total USAID Funding to Central Asia – 1991 to 2004.106 
 Karimov’s obsession with maintaining Uzbekistan’s independence from outside 
influence also limited the amount of cooperation with Russia.  This was especially the 
case in the first years of independence, as Uzbekistan refused to participate in Russian-
backed regional organizations.  Karimov was evidently conscious of the perceived threat 
of what he termed “great-power chauvinism and aggressive nationalism” with respect to 
Russia’s proclivity to strong arm influence in its near abroad.107  Of course, relations with 
the West cooled in the post September 11 environment as Europe and the United States 
became increasingly critical of the country’s human rights record.  This has resulted in a 
notable drift back toward Russia; a drift that has become increasingly evident since the 
2005 Andijon events.  In November 2005, Uzbekistan and Russia signed a pact of 
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allegiance that created a framework for each to come to the aid of the other in response to 
perceived threats to peace or acts of aggression.108   
 Figures 8, 9 and 10 above highlight the huge increases in U.S. funding to 
Uzbekistan after the September 11 attacks.  These increases, coupled with greater 
cooperation between the United States and Uzbekistan in the War on Terror, undoubtedly 
sparked hope for greater U.S. influence in the country.  Olcott points to a “honeymoon 
period of about six months, in late 2001 to early 2002, when observers hoped that 
increased U.S. engagement might lead to much-needed political reforms.”109  Indeed, 
Karimov’s March 2002 visit to Washington resulted in five signed agreements between 
the two countries and committed the Uzbek government to support democratic 
reforms.110 Nevertheless, any moves toward reform were token, at best; and by late 2003 
the U.S. State Department was formally condemning Uzbekistan for its human rights 
record.111  In analyzing Uzbekistan’s foreign policy relations between Russia, the United 
States and other countries in the region, Abdullaev concludes that the Uzbekistan 
believed that its relationship with the United States did not produce the expected 
dividends in terms of financial aid.  More importantly, in spite of Karimov’s token 
concessions, the United States continued to pressure him on human rights and 
legalization of political opposition.  Furthermore, the perceived resolution of the Islamic 
threat from Afghanistan made Karimov less inclined to make concessions to either Russia 
or the United States, resulting in a general trend toward isolation.112  Karimov’s 
crackdown on political dissent in Andijon in May 2005 was simply a continuation of this 
trend; as was the U.S. criticism.   
 The bottom line is that, after sharp increases in development and military aid to 
Uzbekistan in the wake of September 11, the United States still commanded little in 
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terms of influence for political reforms in the country.  Olcott points out that, unlike the 
situation in Kyrgyzstan, the elite support base for political reforms in Uzbekistan was 
very limited, and the country simply did not have the capacity to absorb large increases in 
foreign aid targeted at political projects.113  This leads, of course, to the next line of 
questioning.  Since Karimov was so resistant to external influence, what were the major 
domestic factors that influenced his political choices?  That is the subject of the next 
subsection.    
 2. Domestic Politics 
 Domestic political concerns and their influence on Karimov’s decisions to stifle 
political reform in Uzbekistan can be broken down into several major factors.  
Interestingly, these factors both resemble and, at the same time, represent a departure 
from those that influenced Akayev in Kyrgyzstan.  This section will outline the influence 
of clan politics, the pervasive role of corruption, and the role of political Islam in 
Karimov’s consolidation of executive power.     
a. The Impact of Clan Politics  
  As stated earlier, national identity is a critical factor in Rustow’s 
transitology model of the transition to democracy; it is the only requisite condition.  
Uzbekistan is one of the most homogeneous countries in Central Asia, with 80 percent of 
the population comprised of Uzbeks.  The remaining 20 percent includes Russians (5.5 
percent), Tajiks (5 percent), Kazakhs (3 percent), and others.114  As in most of the Central 
Asian states, however, national identity is complicated by the interplay of clan and 
ethnic/regional identities.  Pride in ethnicity for Uzbeks stands at 51 percent, significantly 
higher that figures for other ethnic groups in the country - Kazakhs (39.1%), Tartars 
(25%), Russians (19.8%), and Tajiks (14.3%).115  However, most Uzbeks link their self-
identity to their local origin, which can essentially be broken down into four major clan 
strongholds – Tashkent, the Ferghana Valley, Samarkand and Bukhara (comprising a 
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single group), and Khorezm.116  Ironically, Karimov himself acknowledges the 
debilitating effect of clan politics on the country’s progress toward democracy.117 
  Clan politics is a major influencing factor in domestic political decisions 
in Uzbekistan.  The power struggle between the major clans played a key role in 
Karimov’s rise to power shortly before the Soviet Union’s collapse.  As Collins points 
out, from 1985 to 1988 Gorbachev pursued a policy to purge the Central Asian republics 
of clan-based corruption and wide-scale clan abuses.  Thousands of individuals were 
removed from positions of power in the Kyrgyz and Uzbek republics.  In Uzbekistan, 
Sharof Rashidov was dismissed, removing his extensive personal clan network, based 
around the city of Jizzakh.  His replacement, Inamzhan Usmonkhodjaev, began 
promoting his own Ferghana Valley clan and, as a result, was also removed on 
Gorbachev’s orders.  Rafiq Nishanov was installed, but since he was viewed as too 
subservient to Moscow, Uzbek clan elites aimed to regain control.  This led to informal 
negotiations among leaders of the major Uzbek clans and their subsequent support for 
Karimov, since he “was not entrenched in any one network but rather was a balancer and 
legitimate broker.”118   The interplay between Karimov and Uzbekistan’s major clans is 
analogous to that of Akayev in Kyrgyzstan – he serves as a power broker. All three 
conditions that give rise to regime durability via pacts between clan were present in 
Uzbekistan as the country became independent: 1) a shared external threat that induced 
cooperation (Afghanistan), 2) a balance of power among the major clan factions and 3) a 
legitimate broker assumed the role of maintaining the pact.119  
  Though Karimov does exercise authoritarian control in Uzbekistan, the 
reality is that power is essentially divided among several major clans, which are territorial 
in origin.  The most powerful of these clans is the Samarkand; Karimov and several key 
government leaders are native Samarkand.  Other government leaders from the 
                                                 
116 Timur Dadabaev, “Post-Soviet Realities of Society in Uzbekistan”, Central Asian Survey, 23, no. 2, 
(2004) 148. 
117 Karimov (1998), 65. 
118 Collins (2004), 240-1. 
119 Ibid., 237. 
 56
Samarkand included the former Minister of Finance, Jamshed Saifiddinov and the former 
minister of Justice, Alisher Mardiyev.  Of the numerous other clans, the Tashkent clan is 
the second most dominant.  Other important clans include the Ferghana Valley clan and 
the Khorezm clan (based in the north Uzbekistan cities of Khiva and Urgench).120  
Muhammad Salih, Karimov’s opponent in the 1991 election, was from the Khorezm clan.  
After driving Salih into exile, Karimov severely repressed his clan.  Members of the 
Tashkent clan, however, are firmly integrated into the administrative system and 
positions in the scientific and cultural arenas.  Timur Alimov, for instance, was the head 
of the Tashkent clan and is the State Councilor for Human Resources.  Other prominent 
Tashkent clan figures include the Minister of Internal Affairs, Zakir Almatov and the 
Minster of Defense, Kadyr Gulomov.121  It is the struggle between the Tashkent and 
Samarkand clans that determines the political situation in Uzbekistan and, as Collins 
argues, limits Karimov’s ability to consolidate his authoritarian regime.122  This 
dichotomy between Karimov and the clan structure is evidenced most clearly in the 
legislature.  Though Karimov sought to decrease clan representation in the parliament by 
creating five pro-government parties, he failed to achieve his goal.  In the 1999 
parliamentary elections, these five parties altogether garnered only 49 percent of the 
seats; clan notables with no party affiliation won the rest.  Furthermore, the three major 
clan networks continually vie for control of a greater share of the country’s natural 
resources:  gold, oil and gas, and cotton.  In essence, the relationship between Karimov 
and Uzbekistan’s clan structure is symbiotic.  While the clans are dependent on his 
patronage for access to resources and wealth, Karimov is dependent on the clans for 
support.  The interests of the clans and Karimov coincide with the need to maintain this 
dichotomy, which essentially rules out any demand for political reform.  There is, 
however, growing evidence that Karimov is slowly beginning to weaken the clans’ hold.  
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He weakened his own Samarkand clan in 2004 by dismissing Ismail Dzhurabekov (leader 
of the Samarkand clan) as his presidential advisor under criminal allegations.  In his post 
as presidential advisor, Dzhurabekov “hired and fired regional leaders and orchestrated 
promotions and resignations of ministers of the cabinet and heads of security structures.  
It was noticed that it was representatives of the Tashkent clan that were usually fired and 
replaced with men from Samarkand.”123  Dzhurabekov’s loss was a serious blow to 
Samarkand power.  At the same time, however, Karimov weakened the powerful 
Tashkent clan by dismissing a onetime leader of the clan, Timur Alimov, as a presidential 
advisor.  He then forced the resignation of another Tashkent clan leader, Defense 
Minister Qodir Gulomov, in November 2005 under charges of corruption and abuse of 
office.  As former British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Craig Murray, noted:  "There are a 
lot of people who used to be in the oligarchy….There were a couple of hundred very 
wealthy families who really benefited from the system. That circle has got smaller and 
smaller and smaller as Karimov narrows it down toward his immediate family."124 
b. The Influence of Corruption 
  Clan politics and corruption are virtually inseparable in Uzbekistan.  
Corruption refers to abusing public office for private gain.  Despite evidence that 
Karimov is consolidating power, clan structures continue to dominate the governmental 
structure in the country.  Gorbachev’s attempt in the late 1980s to break the hold of the 
clans in the wake of massive corruption schemes is telling.  Over 200 Uzbek officials 
were implicated in these massive bribery schemes related to the country’s cotton 
industry.  The case involved huge sums of money and gold, countless offshore accounts 
and multiple assassinations.  After independence, the new government in Uzbekistan 
released all of those officials previously convicted of corruption in the cotton corruption 
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scheme.  Moreover, the majority of them eventually received high-level government 
posts after gaining their freedom.125        
  Because of the close link between clan structures and corruption, it is 
difficult to isolate the impact of the latter on Karimov’s decisions to repress political 
opposition.  There is ample evidence of the pervasiveness of corruption in the country.  In 
a public opinion survey conducted in 2001 among young people in Uzbekistan, 100 
percent of the respondents cited “extortion on the part of customs officials” as a problem 
obstructing the development of transboundary businesses.126  Again, data from 
Transparency International highlights this point (refer to Table 4).  While a CPI score of 
less than 3 represents rampant corruption, Uzbekistan scored a 2005 rating of 2.2, ranking 
the country 143rd of the 159 countries surveyed; only Tajikistan and Turkmenistan were 
more corrupt in the region.127  Moreover, the country’s historical ratings indicate that 
Karimov is fighting a losing battle against corruption, if indeed he is fighting one.  As 
illustrated in Figure 11 below, the level of corruption in Uzbekistan continues to worsen.   
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Figure 11.  Historical CPI Ratings for Uzbekistan.128 
  There is considerable evidence, however, that as Karimov works to 
consolidate power he is also securing access to the country’s resources for himself and 
his family.  Karimov tries to shield his personal life from public view.  However, details 
of the divorce of his daughter, Gulnara Karimova, from the U.S.-Uzbek Mansur Maqsudi 
underscore the family’s wealth.  Karimova reportedly received, as part of the asset 
division from a New Jersey court, over $11 million in cash and foreign investments as 
well as business holdings valued at $60 million.129 In early 2003, “the government’s 
monopoly Internet service provider, UzPAK, blocked several Russia-based news Web 
sites after they posted articles by an anonymous analyst about government corruption in 
Karimov’s inner circle.”130  Essentially, Karimov cloaks many of his political maneuvers 
with an anti-corruption stance.  The dismissals of prominent clan members mentioned 
above were accompanied by allegations or criminal charges of corruption and abuse of 
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office.  Karimov pays considerable lip service to his anti-corruption stance and his 
rhetoric sounds convincing: “at a political level corruption implies an explicit resistance 
to the ongoing reforms and objectively combines the interests of the obsolete 
administrative-command system…”131  There is little evidence, however, that this 
rhetoric is much more than simply a disguise for political power plays against powerful 
clan interests that represent rivals to his own power.  As Abdullaev notes, “from the onset 
of this decade, a corruption pyramid has taken on its final form.”132  The base of this 
pyramid is comprised of small and medium-sized business owners who make payments 
to government representatives.  The pinnacle of the pyramid, of course, is increasingly 
dominated by members of Karimov’s inner circle. 
c. Political Islam and Uzbekistan Politics 
  It is almost impossible to discuss democratic reform in Uzbekistan without 
considering the role of political Islam in the country.  Just as he consistently speaks out 
against rampant corruption and its debilitating effect on the country’s progress, Karimov 
has always been consistent in targeting radical Islam as a threat to Uzbekistan’s security.  
As he wrote in 1998, “modern history has accumulated many facts to testify that these 
extremely radical manifestations give rise to serious conflicts and contradictions, and 
threaten stability and security.”133  At the same time, however, Karimov has also been 
consistent in displaying public reverence for Islam and identifying his regime with the 
Islamic heritage of Uzbekistan.  On the eve of the presidential elections of 1991, for 
instance, Karimov declared in an interview that “Islam is the conscience, the essence of 
life, the very life of our countrymen.”134  Still, Karimov’s continued repression of 
independent, political Islam and his overarching fear of Islamic fundamentalism raises 
important questions about Islam’s impact on Uzbekistan politics.  Did the threat of 
Islamic fundamentalism cause Karimov to concentrate power out of a need to maintain 
security?  Or is it the other way around:  did Karimov’s repression of political opposition 
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cause an increase in Islamic fundamentalism in the country?  This section will address 
these questions by examining the nature of political Islam at the beginning of Uzbekistan 
independence and then analyzing the impact of Karimov’s policies in light of different 
theories on the emergence of radical Islam.   
  Uzbekistan is about 88 percent Muslim and approximately 9 percent 
Russian Orthodox.135  As in most of Central Asia, Uzbekistan’s Muslim population is 
predominantly Sunni, adhering to the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam, the largest of the four 
schools of Islam and generally the most moderate and open to new ideas.  More 
importantly, the liberal tradition of the Hanafi school allowed for the incorporation of 
many of the pre-Islamic traditions of Central Asia.136  Some norms of tribal and 
customary law in Central Asian culture, for instance, were recognized as legal and in 
accordance with Islamic rules.  Of all the Central Asian states, however, Uzbekistan is 
the most uniformly religious.  The densely populated Ferghana Valley, particularly the 
cities of Namangan and Andijon, has traditionally been a stronghold of Islamic activism 
and various religious trends, to include Wahhabism.  Additionally, the Karakalpak region 
in the northern part of the country has been one of the main centers of Sufi activism.137  
As a result, despite the legacy of Tsarist and Soviet repression of Islam in Central Asia, 
and particularly Uzbekistan, it has remained an integral part of Uzbek society and culture.   
  In tracing the roots of fundamentalist Islamic thought in Uzbekistan, it is 
important to first characterize the meaning of the term.  Fundamentalism refers to the 
tendencies in Islam that advocate a return to the origins of the religion and the purging of 
extraneous features.  The term Salafi is often used to identify these fundamentalists.  
Within Salifism, there are militant jihadist (like Bin Laden) and nonjihadist divisions.  
Pro-Salafi ideas first came to Uzbekistan by way of immigrants from the Middle East 
prior to World War II.   The first Salafi teachers appeared in the region between 1950 and 
1970 but they were relatively isolated and had little influence on the population.  The 
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period stretching into the late 1980s, however, witnessed relatively less repressive Soviet 
rule and the Salafis were able attract more recruits and teach them in underground 
madrasas.  At this time, however, they did not call for direct struggle against the Soviet 
regime.  At the close of the 1980s, the Salafis began to promote a more puritanical and 
conservative form of Islam.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Salafis began to 
organize in the Ferghana Valley, calling for adoption of the Shari’a and the creation of an 
Islamic state.  “They continued, however, to advocate dialogue with the authorities, and 
in general they eschewed violence during this period.”138      
  Despite efforts by the Uzbek authorities to keep a tight lid on opposition 
political activity, the formation of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Uzbekistan (IRPU) in 
January 1991 marked the first political platform based on Islamic foundations.  However, 
the organization failed to put forward a cohesive political platform and continually 
advocated ambiguous and sometimes even contradictory goals.  While the IRPU called 
for social justice and the formation of an Islamic state, it was considerably less clear 
about how this state would operate and how far it would extend.139   Nevertheless, in 
February 1991 the Uzbek regime adopted a new law that banned religiously-inspired 
political parties.  In the end, the IRPU maintained a nationalist trajectory and worked 
with the secular Birlik party to challenge Karimov’s election in 1991, hoping to overturn 
the ban on religious parties after the country gained independence.  The IRPU failed to 
gain a substantial foothold among the populace and never mounted a serious challenge to 
Karimov’s authority.140   
  The year 1992 marked the real turning point for the nature of political 
Islam in Uzbekistan.  In December 1991, fundamentalist Muslims and members of other 
Islamic groups such as the IRPU, Towba and Andolat participated in a demonstration in 
the Ferghana Valley city of Namangan, capturing a communist party building with the 
intention of establishing an Islamic center.  While Karimov was still trying to consolidate 
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his hold on the country, radical Islamists in the Ferghana Valley managed to mobilize 
popular support.  They replaced traditional imams who remained loyal to the government 
and the cities of Namangan, Margelan and Andijon became strongholds for militant 
Islamic support.  Muslim clerics, like Imam Abdul Ahad in Namangan, began to call for 
the rule of Shari’a law as a solution to the inequality, despotism and general disorder 
related to the Karimov regime.141  The protest in Namangan rapidly transformed into a 
Muslim self-government movement.  Adolat, for instance, was comprised mostly of 
young men organized into neighborhood militias, which started providing security in the 
streets and controlling prices at the markets.  After taking over the building in Namangan, 
however, the protestors demanded that the government proclaim the establishment of an 
Islamic state and implement the Shari’a as the country’s sole legal system.  In February 
1992, Adolat, the IRPU and the two major secular opposition parties (Erk and Birlik) 
asked Karimov to initiate negotiations with the fundamentalists in Namangan.  With the 
help of loyal law enforcement agencies, he instead cracked down on the Islamists.  All 
foreign missionaries were expelled from the country and leaders of the Islamic and 
secular opposition were arrested.  Since this crackdown, Islamic fundamentalism in the 
country has remained underground.  The government has arrested thousands because of 
their religious beliefs and deadly bombings in February 1999 and March 2004 were 
attributed to militant Islamic groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).  
Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which claims a non-violent philosophy, also remains active in Uzbekistan 
despite constant government persecution.  Members publish and disseminated dozens of 
books, circulate leaflets and publish a journal.142    
  There is considerable evidence, however, that political Islam was 
relatively moderate in Uzbekistan when the country gained independence.  A 1994 public 
opinion study showed a rapidly growing interest in Islam in the country, but also 
indicated that Uzbeks had limited personal understanding of the religion’s main precepts.  
Furthermore, it suggested that Islamic belief was weakest among the younger generations 
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and few respondents favored a form of Islam that would be politically active.143  
Dadabaev’s 2003 study of Uzbekistan underscored the fact that secularism still has a firm 
hold on the country (Figure 12).  Equally telling is the fact that studies and policy papers 
on Uzbekistan in the early 1990s reflected this general, moderate perception of Islam in 
the country.  Graham Fuller’s report for the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, written 
after the 1992 crackdown, underscores the point: 
There is no doubt that Islam has grown in Uzbekistan….Yet there is no reason to 
assume that fundamentalism is about to take over:  increased Islamic activism is 
not synonymous with fundamentalism.  Islam could greatly increase its clout in 
Uzbekistan and elsewhere, however, if economic conditions should sharply 
deteriorate, if  government policies are generally unpopular and repressive…[and] 
if “official Islam” in the republic will not be allowed to enjoy a status somewhat 
independent of the government and its policies.”144     
 
 
Figure 12.  Attendance of Religious Institutions in Uzbekistan - 2003.145 
  The bottom line is that Islamic fundamentalism became a security threat in 
Uzbekistan because of the repressive measures taken by Karimov.  Naumkin cites 
numerous theoretical approaches to explain the emergence of militant Islam.146  Among 
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these approaches, those that stress socioeconomic conditions and those stressing political 
deprivation are certainly applicable to Uzbekistan.  While it is a fact that Salifism and 
Wahhabism were exported to Central Asia, it is also true that conditions in Uzbekistan 
have presented a fertile breeding ground.  In many respects, Karimov consistently sees 
Islamic extremism behind all political opposition in Uzbekistan precisely because he has 
forced any opposition to use Islam and its underground structure (dating to Soviet-era 
religious policies) to express dissatisfaction with the regime.  Furthermore, the 
socioeconomic conditions in the country accentuate the problem, providing despair and 
legitimate grievances against the government.  Interestingly, Karimov’s recent 
acknowledgement that the May 2005 Andijon uprising was related to economic turmoil 
and not simply Muslim extremists is a curious change.147  It remains to be seen, however, 
whether this translates into more progress on economic reform.      
 3. Summary 
 A transitology analysis of Uzbekistan’s transition from communist rule, by 
necessity, focuses almost exclusively on Islam Karimov.  More specifically, it focuses on 
the factors that influenced his decisions to concentrate power in the presidency.  
Following the initial voter referendum that brought Karimov to power in 1991, he 
aggressively repressed all political opposition and has continued to consolidate power.  
Furthermore, Karimov’s regime successfully resisted external pressure, particularly from 
the United States, to implement political reform.  The fact of the matter is that there has 
never been an elite support base for political reform in Uzbekistan since Karimov 
disbanded legitimate opposition parties.  As a result, the amount of leverage the United 
States could bring to bear has been limited because Uzbekistan lacked the capacity to 
absorb large increases in U.S. foreign assistance that was designed specifically for 
political reform.148     
 The causal forces that explain Karimov’s drive toward dictatorship are 
exclusively related to domestic political factors.  Chief among these are clan politics and 
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rampant, pervasive corruption.  The influence of political Islam is somewhat complicated, 
but this analysis indicates that, initially, Islam was not a causal factor in Karimov’s 
repression of political opposition.  Religious-oriented political parties were banned by the 
country’s constitution before the uprising at Namanga in late 1991.  Moreover, the 
Islamic movement up to that point had been relatively moderate in its aims and was 
willing to work with the government to meet its objectives.  It was after this uprising, 
however, that Karimov banned all political opposition parties.  Militant political Islam 
was more the result of Karimov’s repression than the other way around.    
 Of course, to date there seems to have been little public demand for political 
reform in the country, though there is evidence that this is starting to change.  Uzbeks are 
becoming increasingly vocal about political and economic themes.  As Olcott points out, 
“All this suggests that the citizens of Uzbekistan will continue to press for political 
change, even if force is used by the state to try to control them.”149  This brings to the 
forefront, however, the issue of Uzbekistan’s structural foundation for democracy.  Is this 
foundation sufficient to support democratic reform?  As questions swirl regarding 
succession issues surrounding Karimov, the question remains as to whether the country 
has progressed enough, structurally, to support democratic reform.  The following section 
will address this side of the debate.   
D. ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
 This section will analyze the structural variables that are often referred to as the 
foundation for democracy.  Integral to this analysis is a closer look at Uzbekistan’s 
economic development as well as its progress toward a market economy.  Additionally, 
education levels, urbanization and income distribution are important because they relate 
directly to class structure and the development of a middle class.  Finally, civic 
institutions are essential in terms of generating support for the eventual emergence of 
opposition parties and democracy.      
 1. Economic Development Factors 
As mentioned earlier, there is a complex interconnection between politics and 
economics and, in general, it is impossible to liberalize the economy without liberalizing 
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public life as well.   Therefore, it is necessary to examine Uzbekistan’s economic 
development as well as its reform process.  This subsection will examine the overall state 
of Uzbekistan’s economic development as well as it progress toward liberal reform.   
Economic indicators for Uzbekistan (2005), with comparisons to other states in 
the region, are presented in Table 12 below.  While GDP, unemployment and poverty 
figures relate directly to economic development, the GINI Index, based on a comparison 
between actual and uniform income distribution, quantifies the disparity between the 
upper and lower classes in society.  Taken together, these figures present a relatively 
dismal view of the country’s economy.  Though economic growth seems respectable, the 
reliability of this data is suspect.  The U.S. Department of State explicitly rejects 
Uzbekistan’s figures on economic growth.  For instance, Uzbekistan reported a growth 
rate of 4.2 percent in 2003; the U.S. Department of State claimed that the increase was 
only 0.3 percent.150  The country also has high underemployment, almost a third of the 
population lives below the poverty line (even that figure is subject to debate), and 
inflation remains problematic at over 20 percent.151  Furthermore, the GINI index points 
to an income distribution level that is roughly equal to that of neighboring Kyrgyzstan.   
     








Uzbekistan 7.2% $1,800 0.7%* 26.8 28% 
Kyrgyzstan 2% $2,100 18% 29 40% 
Tajikistan 8.0% $1,200 12% 34.7 64% 
Mongolia 6.2% $1,900 6.7% 44 36.1% 
  * Note:  Official statistic, but underemployment is reportedly 20%.   
Table 12.  Uzbekistan Economic Indicators.152 
Human development indicators are presented in Table 13 and represent a broad 
view of the country’s standard of living in comparison with other states in the region.  
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The Human Development index is a composite index that combines measurements in life 
expectancy, education indicators, and standard of living figures.  The education index 
measures a country’s relative achievement in adult literacy as well as enrollment in 
primary, secondary and tertiary education.  In general, though the overall Human 
Development Index is higher than other states in the region, there is a slight disparity 
with respect to Uzbek access to higher education.  Like Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan is 
categorized as medium level of development by the Human Development Report.  
However, the country’s state of economic development is only part of a broader picture 
related to how the country’s is transitioning from the command economy of the Soviet 
era toward a more liberal, market-oriented one. 
 The initial period of independence brought unprecedented economic losses for all 
of the Soviet-bloc countries.  Uzbekistan, however, experienced the smallest contraction 
in GDP among the group.  By 1997, the country’s output was about 85 percent of its 
1991 level, significantly better than the 60 percent average for Russia, the Baltics, and 
other former Soviet states.153  The major reasons for this trend were the country’s low 
degree of initial industrialization, its reliance on cotton production, and its self-
sufficiency in energy.154  Other factors included the country’s closed economy, which 
enabled it to sustain production even in non-competitive enterprises, as well as its 
institutional stability.155  Many of the Soviet-era institutions were preserved and only 
slightly modified.  After the initial downturn phase of the transition period, however, 
these institutions served to limit economic development.  Though Uzbekistan avoided 
much of the initial pain of rapid transformation, by 2003 it had fallen behind all of the 
other CIS countries with respect to economic growth (See Figure 13).   
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Figure 13.  Central Asia GDP Growth Rates After Independence.156 
 












Uzbekistan 0.709 76% 0.91 36.8% 
United States 0.939 92% 0.97 79.8% 
Russia 0.795 88% 0.95 73.3% 
Tajikistan 0.652 73% 0.91 25% 
Kyrgyzstan 0.702 82% 0.93 34.0% 
Mongolia 0.679 74% 0.90 46.1% 
Table 13.  Uzbekistan Living Standards Indicators.157 
 As mentioned earlier, Uzbekistan resisted serious economic reform following 
independence.  Initially, the newly independent states all attempted to prevent sharp 
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declines in GDP, fight inflation, stabilize recently introduced national currencies and 
control political and social tensions.  These initial economic reforms were, by necessity, 
aimed at stabilizing macroeconomic indicators.158 In Uzbekistan, structural policies were 
aimed primarily at public investments targeted at substituting energy and industrial 
imports, coupled with an extensive system of transfers to the state-controlled industrial 
sector.  The country continues to maintain communist-era state purchase and price 
control systems in its agricultural sector.  Uzbek farmers, operating mainly on collective 
or communal farms, continue to work toward established production targets and receive 
deflated purchase prices from the state, which controls the export market.  The end result 
is that Uzbekistan has one of the lowest ratings for its development and implementation 
of market reforms.  Tables 14 and 15 below illustrate the country’s lack of commitment 
to the first and second state economic policy reforms, respectively.  Scores in these tables 
are based on ratings from one to five, with five representing the most advanced level of 
reform.  In almost all categories, only Turkmenistan ranks below Uzbekistan among 










Uzbekistan 2.0 3.0 2.7 2.7 
Kyrgyzstan 5.0 4.0 3.7 5.0 
Kazakhstan 3.3 4.0 3.0 4.0 
Tajikistan 3.3 4.0 2.3 3.7 
Turkmenistan 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.7 
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Uzbekistan 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.0 1.7 
Kyrgyzstan 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.0 1.7 
Kazakhstan 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.3 2.3 
Tajikistan 1.7 1.7 2.0 1.0 1.3 
Turkmenistan 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Table 15.  Second Stage Economic Reform Ratings – Central Asia 2005.160 
 Several factors help explain the country’s hesitancy to implement economic 
reforms, despite several agreements with the IMF and the World Bank.  First and 
foremost among these is resistance from the country’s elite.  Olcott underscores this line 
of thinking, linking decisions on the pace of privatization and other reforms to the 
personal interests of Karimov, his inner circle and a small group of regional elite.  Her 
point is well taken; the small group of elites that controls the country’s export trade and 
benefit from the state’s partial purchase of cotton and grain (at less than world market 
prices), continue to make vast fortunes on the transactions.  Not surprisingly, they would 
have little interest in privatization or lifting price controls.161  Moreover, state officials 
continue to think in terms of Soviet-era paradigms, linking economic development to 
increases in production.  Additionally, there is real fear among the elite that reforming the 
Uzbek economy and privatizing key sectors will result in social instability and dramatic 
increases in unemployment.  These fears are not necessarily unfounded, the EBRD 
estimates that implementation of a unified exchange rate could result in the loss of up to 
250,000 jobs.162  Another important factor is the role of the clan structure in the country’s 
economic system.  Clans, as an economic institution in Uzbekistan, “are inclined to 
engage in state capture and to distort state policy in order to create rents.  These therefore 
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constitute important anti-reform forces.”163  Nevertheless, the country’s policies continue 
to hamper the development of small and medium-scale enterprises.      
 The bottom line is that Uzbekistan’s government continues to delay implementing 
real economic reform, mainly out of fear of causing social unrest.  The reforms that have 
been initiated, moreover, are proving problematic in terms of actual implementation.  On 
October 15, 2003 the country introduced the convertibility of the national currency (sum).  
On the surface, these are promising signs of transition to a market-based economy.  
However, the convertibility of the national currency was accompanied by raising trade 
barriers and tightening control of wholesale trading, which nullified many of the benefits 
of reforming the currency.  Worse still, the level of corruption and state-sponsored entry 
barriers to the market (in the forms of bribery for permits and licenses) continues to stifle 
the growth of small and medium-sized businesses.  According to a 2003 study, for 
instance, 43 percent of these enterprises reported that they recently handed out bribes to 
government officials.164        
 In general, the country’s economic development path presents a puzzle.  The 
regime has taken very small steps toward liberalization, but still maintains much of the 
Soviet-era control of the economy.  What remains more important, however, is the 
population’s perception of the country’s economic system.  This, in general, impacts the 
willingness and ability of the society to demand reform.  The state continues to protect 
living standards by providing services to meet society’s basic needs (water, gas and 
electricity, etc.).  Also, the overwhelming majority of Uzbekistan’s citizens live in private 
homes or privately-owned apartments; only about three percent of Uzbeks rent their 
apartment.165  Nevertheless, there is increasing evidence that Uzbeks are becoming 
increasingly dissatisfied with their economic outlook and their living conditions.  Olcott 
notes that increasing public restiveness is linked to deteriorating economic conditions.  
Karimov’s recent admission that poor economic conditions contributed to the May 2005 
Andijon uprising reinforces this point.  Overall, limited numbers of Uzbekistan’s 
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population classify their living standards as high.  In the 20 to 29 year group, only 3.6 
percent consider their living standard as high.  The vast majority rate their standard of 
living as average.166  More importantly, public criticism centers on the central 
government’s failed economic policies; 46.5 percent completely distrust and 32.8 percent 
distrust the government on this issue.167        
 Though this economic data is complex and somewhat puzzling, the bottom line is 
that it is a mere backdrop to the Karimov regime’s conscious decisions to centralize 
power.  Economic indicators such as per capita GDP, poverty and inflation rates clearly 
point to a distressed economy, and the combination of corruption as well as the elite and 
clan power structure serve to limit the extent of economic reform.  However, a closer 
look at the nature of civil society in the country will shed additional light on the prospects 
for democratic reform.   
 2. Societal Attitudes and the Development of Civil Society 
 Along with economic performance, prospects for democratic reform are closely 
linked to societal attitudes and the emergence of civil society.  Societal attitudes toward 
democratic ideals as well as the prevailing attitudes about the government are central to 
the prospects for reform.  Civil Society refers to the set of institutions and organizations 
located between the state, the business community, and the family structure.  It includes 
voluntary and non-profit organizations as well as political movements and other forms of 
societal engagement.  This analysis will focus on the status of Uzbekistan’s development 
of civil society, in spite of the government’s active policies to prevent its emergence.     
 There are several indications that Uzbek society is reaching a crossroads.  
Growing dissatisfaction with the Karimov regime and its economic policies and 
frustration with the pervasiveness of corruption are fanning this dissatisfaction.  In terms 
of the public’s trust in institutions, the central government instills more trust than NGOs 
and local government, but falls behind international business and international 
institutions like the WTO and the IMF (see Figure 13).  Considering the extent to which 
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Karimov has sought to limit the influence of international actors, these figures are 
striking.   



































Figure 14.  Uzbek Society and Institutional Trust.168 
 It is also evident that Uzbeks are inclined to support more in the way of 
democratic reforms.  A 2002 Pew Research Center survey indicated that 85 percent of 
Uzbeks held a favorable view of the United States.169  Additionally, Dadabaev’s study 
confirms the belief in democratic governance among the Uzbek society.  Among various 
political systems, a government in which one leader rules without interference by 
parliament and without elections (similar to the situation in Uzbekistan today) was 
rejected by 66.9 percent of the populace.  The majority of Uzbeks believe that a 
democratic system of governance is “very suitable” (43.9 percent) or “rather preferable” 
(40.1 percent) for the country.170   
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 Analyzing the status of civil society in Uzbekistan presents an initial view that 
was fairly optimistic, but then certain external events alarmed the Karimov regime and 
the tide turned against NGOs and the emergent civil society. Throughout the 1990s the 
growth of Western NGOs in Uzbekistan served as a significant boost to the prospects for 
liberalization (see Figure 15).   





























Figure 15. Growth of Newly Registered NGOs in Uzbekistan.171 
Despite these efforts, however, the country still lacked significant progress on a number 
of different fronts directly linked to civil society.  These included freedom of information 
and respect for human rights. For these reasons, Polat noted in 1999 that “the basis for 
creating civil society does not yet exist in Uzbekistan”.172  In fact, he criticized the West 
for creating too many internationally funded organizations which have weak roots in the 
Uzbek society and, in reality, are “government-organized NGOs.”173  Of course, these 
points became secondary at the end of 2003 and in early 2004.  In 2003, Uzbekistan 
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failed to receive the expected level of assistance funding from the EBRD and the United 
States due to problems associated with human rights.  Furthermore, Karimov’s regime 
became increasingly alarmed by the events of the Rose Revolution in Tbilisi in late 2003, 
which culminated in the resignation of Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze.  Since 
many in the regime saw a clear link between American organizations and the protests in 
Tbilisi, the Uzbek government set out to limit the influence of these organizations.174  By 
January 1, 2004, all mass media in the country were forced to register with the 
government; this included bulletins published by NGOs.  The government also 
announced a re-registration of all international organizations, with a deadline of March 1, 
2004.  This requirement was repeated in June 2006.  The end effect of these measures has 
been a drastic reduction in the number independent NGOs operating in the country.  Over 
200 domestic, non-profit organizations have been forced to close in 2006 and numerous 
international NGOs have been forced to leave.175      
E. CONCLUSION 
This analysis of the obstacles to democracy in Uzbekistan, by necessity, clearly 
centers on Islam Karimov and the motivating factors that have influenced his decisions to 
concentrate power.  Since his election in December 1991, Karimov has consistently and 
methodically repressed any political opposition in the country and basically established a 
dictatorship thinly veiled as a democracy.  Additionally, he has resisted external pressures 
to implement both economic as well as political reform.  Despite increasing amounts of 
U.S. aid to Uzbekistan in the early 2000’s, along with formal pledges and agreements to 
implement democratic reforms, the Karimov regime refused to take meaningful steps 
toward opening its political system or implementing market-oriented reforms.   
Furthermore, though it is possible to argue that the United States could have 
boosted its commitment to try to secure more progress on reforms, this analysis indicates 
that domestic factors have most profoundly influenced Karimov’s decisions.  
Specifically, clan politics and corruption form a complex marriage that permeates the 
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political dynamics of the country and have been the driving force for Karimov’s moves to 
concentrate power and stifle political opposition.  Karimov’s ascendancy to power was 
made possible by his perceived role as a power broker among the rival clans in the 
country.  Moreover, he continues to skillfully manipulate the power balance between the 
powerful Tashkent and Samarkand clans to maintain their patronage.  While the 
dominant role of clan politics and corruption may not be surprising, the impact on other 
factors is certainly intriguing.  Political Islam, for instance, seems to be caught in the 
middle of this interplay.  The cellular, underground structure of political Islam, a legacy 
of seventy years of repression under Soviet rule, lends itself perfectly to underground 
political dissent.  While Karimov uses political Islam as a scapegoat for his repression of 
any and all opposition, the reasons for that opposition often go unanswered.  Growing 
discontent with the country’s economic situation, the pervasiveness of rampant 
corruption and ineffectiveness in the government are pushing dissidents toward the only 
outlet available for voicing and organizing opposition – political Islam.    
Analysis of the structural foundations in Uzbekistan provides a complicated set of 
results.  They underscore the fact that the country still has considerable structural 
obstacles to democratic reform.  Though the country has made very little progress toward 
implementing a market-driven economy, its economy remains relatively stable, especially 
compared to other countries in the region.  GDP growth remains somewhat respectable, 
but underemployment and unemployment continue to be problematic.  Also, the 
government’s continued reliance on Soviet-era economic institutions and economic 
philosophies is stifling economic growth.  It is also clear that the culture of government 
corruption, which extends from the executive branch all the way down to the local 
officials, is taking its toll on the economy in Uzbekistan and on the citizens’ level of 
discontent.    Furthermore, because the government has effectively repressed civil society 
in the country, these citizens are left with very few avenues to express their 
dissatisfaction.  The end result of this rising frustration is inevitably public demonstration 
such as the Andijon uprising in May 2005, where public dissatisfaction culminated in 
resistance and, subsequently, a violent crack-down by the government.   
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Does this analysis point to any realistic options for U.S. foreign policy and the 
Bush doctrine’s stated goal of promoting democracy?  As stated previously, promoting 
democracy requires patience, a long-term commitment and a multi-dimensional 
approach.  Moreover, it is abundantly clear that democratic reform in Uzbekistan is not 
possible as long as Karimov is the country’s president.  Increased U.S. aid fails to deliver 
influence and firm commitments from this regime are clearly not trustworthy.  At present, 
the only avenue available for the United States is to continue to press for an increased 
presence of international NGOs in the country in the hopes of trying to build-up 
Uzbekistan’s embryonic civil society and increase freedom of information.  To do so, 
must be ready to engage future leaders of Uzbekistan and encourage economic and 





This thesis combined transitology and structural analyses to examine the obstacles 
to democracy in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.  On the structural side, economic 
underdevelopment has stifled the emergence of a larger middle class segment in both 
countries and serves as a catalyst for societal dissatisfaction.  Moreover, transitology 
analysis of domestic factors indicates that the complex interplay of corruption and clan 
politics is central to democracy’s plight in both countries.  The countries’ trajectories 
diverge, however, with respect to economic reform and civil society.  Kyrgyzstan’s 
advanced progress in implementing market reforms set the stage for the growth of a 
relatively vibrant civil society.  On the other hand, Uzbekistan’s resistance to such 
reforms is tied to the dominant role of clan politics, elite control of state resources, 
corruption, and the government’s fear of social unrest, all of which culminate in the 
repression of civil society and political opposition.  Finally, the role of external factors, 
such as U.S. aid and influence, varied considerably between the two countries.  U.S. 
influence in Kyrgyzstan was enhanced by the presence of NGOs, political opposition 
parties, a growing civil society and a commitment to market-oriented reform.  This 
enabled the U.S. to maintain significant levels of development aid, though there is 
substantial evidence that the United States should have done more to tie this aid more 
concretely to political reform.  In Uzbekistan, on the other hand, the United States found 
it increasingly difficult to generate any momentum with respect to influencing the 
Karimov regime.  The regime simply refused to implement meaningful economic and 
political reforms despite massive amounts of U.S. aid and diplomatic pressure.         
The overall goal of this analysis, however, is to illuminate possible policy options 
or considerations for the United States with respect to promoting democracy in 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.  Even though President Bush is in his last term in office, it is 
unlikely that the U.S. foreign policy emphasis on promoting democracy is going to 
change anytime soon.  Monten, for instance, effectively points out that this is not a new 
idea in U.S. foreign policy and, more importantly, it is linked to the interplay of power 
and nationalism.  The evolution of a more aggressive foreign policy of democracy 
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promotion is intimately linked to the emergent role of the United States as the sole 
superpower along with a foreign policy nationalism that views the United States as an 
instrument for democratic change (either by exemplarism or vindicationism).176 With this 
in mind, it is necessary for U.S. policy options to strike a balance between available 
resources and realistic expectations for political change.               
The bottom line from analyses of these two countries is that, while there are 
certainly parallels in terms of obstacles to democracy, such as the interplay of clan 
politics and corruption, the key difference centers on economic reform.  Continuous U.S. 
economic aid and the emergence of civil society in Kyrgyzstan, largely resulting from 
NGO activity and the country’s progress on economic reforms, are serving as a potential 
counterbalance to the forces of clan politics and corruption.  The absence of economic 
reform in Uzbekistan, coupled with increased repression of civil society, has resulted in 
the forces of clan politics and corruption running unchecked and crushing democratic as 
well as economic reforms.  In fact, the issue of economic reform routinely serves as the 
catalyst for prolonged political struggle between rival factions in post-communist states.  
It is this prolonged struggle that Rustow defines as central to the preparatory phase as a 
nation transitions to democracy.177 For Kyrgyzstan, the issues of economic reform and, 
currently, that of constitutional reform, are providing the prolonged political struggle that, 
hopefully, will lead to a breakthrough and more democratic governance.  In Uzbekistan, 
however, the only rival factions are based on clan loyalties and the only issue of 
contention is who gets to control the country’s resources.  The United States must focus 
its democracy promotion activities in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to take these factors 
into consideration.   
The relative openness of society in Kyrgyzstan and the rise of political opposition 
mean that the United States can afford to invest its resources in securing more procedural 
democratic reforms.  At the same time, U.S. policy must continue to assist Kyrgyzstan to 
ensure that it completes its economic reform agenda as well as structure its constitutional 
reforms to prevent the future concentration of power in the executive branch.  As 
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Bakiyev works with opposition parties to hammer out a new constitutional framework, 
the United States should offer clear support for the process, and link substantial amounts 
of aid to a successful and fair outcome that preserves the principles of power separation.   
In Uzbekistan, the focus and priority must be on economic reform incentives and, 
furthermore, these must continue to be tied to concrete milestones.  In looking at the 
framework of U.S. policy initiatives on the subject, much of this seems to be in place.  
The Omnibus Appropriations for fiscal year 2003, for instance, forbade Freedom Support 
Act assistance to Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State reported that the country was 
making progress in meetings its pledges to democratize and honor human rights.  By late 
2003, the administration decided that Uzbekistan no longer met these conditions.  The 
conditions were retained in subsequent FSA legislation and in mid-2004 the State 
Department announced that up to $18 million in aid to Uzbekistan would be withheld due 
to “lack of progress on democratic reform and restrictions put on U.S. assistance partners 
on the ground.”178  The Foreign Operations Appropriations for fiscal year 2006 was 
signed into law in November 2005 and called for $20 million in Freedom Support Aid to 
Uzbekistan.  More importantly, it continued language that conditions aid on progress in 
democratization and respect for human rights; it also recommends that the Uzbek 
government allow an international investigation into the May 2005 events at Andijon.179     
It is essential that the United States orient its policy with respect to promoting 
democracy in Uzbekistan toward the prospect of Karimov’s succession.  This event is 
looming on the not-too-distant horizon; he is 68 years old with numerous health problems 
and life expectancy in Central Asia is typically around 60 years.  Furthermore, the pattern 
of clan politics in Central Asia dictates that political transition in Uzbekistan is likely to 
be non-transparent and decided by a handful of powerbrokers and clan elites.  Moreover, 
given Karimov’s hold on power, it seems unlikely that he will initiate an orderly 
succession while he is still firmly in control.  The key consideration with respect to this 
transition is the need to maintain stability in the country.  The United States must 
maintain the ability to engage the next generation of leaders in Uzbekistan, in business, 
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government, military and other areas.  As Rumer stated, “Such an effort, combined with a 
carefully targeted program of economic assistance, are the best options U.S. policy has at 
its disposal for influencing the long-term trends in Central Asia and helping it achieve 
long-term stability and security.”180 
 Democracy in Central Asia is central to the long-term objectives of the Global 
War on Terror.  Countering the rise of militant Islam in this region will require economic 
development and a general opening of society to allow for political dissent and 
opposition.  Uzbekistan is a case in point.  The longer Uzbekistan forestalls economic 
reform, stifling economic growth, the more disenfranchised the society will become.  
Since the Karimov regime continues to repress any and all opposition, it forces those 
disenfranchised citizens to seek out militant Islam, with its cellular and clandestine 
structure, as a means of voicing opposition.  President Bush described this very scenario: 
Imagine what it's like to be a young person living in a country that is not moving 
toward reform. You're 21 years old, and while your peers in other parts of the 
world are casting their ballots for the first time, you are powerless to change the 
course of your government. 
While your peers in other parts of the world have received educations that prepare 
them for the opportunities of a global economy, you have been fed propaganda 
and conspiracy theories that blame others for your country's shortcomings. 
And everywhere you turn, you hear extremists who tell you that you can escape 
your misery and regain your dignity through violence and terror and 
martyrdom.”181 
 
This is happening in countries like Uzbekistan today.  To counter this tend, the 
United States must continue to actively promote democracy in Central Asia.  This has to 
begin with pushing Kyrgyzstan toward its democratic destiny and preparing the ground 
for democratic changes in Uzbekistan in the aftermath of Karimov’s reign.  The soil on 
the steppes of Central Asia may not be the most hospitable for democracy, but patient and 
skillful cultivation and irrigation can still produce high yields.   
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